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Introduction
William S. Kern
Western Michigan University

With stunning speed the socialist experiments of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union have now apparently come to an end. Despite
half a century or more of efforts directed by Communist leaders toward
building socialism, the citizens of these countries now find that the
structure for which they had endured great sacrifices will not survive.
The citizens of these nations are now faced with the prospect of con
structing a new economic structure based upon a foundation of markets
and private ownership.
The problems produced by the transformation of these economies
was the theme of a lecture series held at Western Michigan University
during the 1990-91 school year. The lectures presented form the basis
of this volume.
The volume begins with Paul Marer's paper, which examines the
major obstacles in the path of countries seeking to convert their econo
mies to market systems. It serves as a natural starting point, as it pro
vides an excellent overview of the major issues to be faced by the
countries in the process of transition.
Marer points out that the countries of Eastern Europe have several
models to emulate in creating their own market economies. These
options include a social market economy of the sort typified by West
Germany or a consumerist market economy of the U.S. type. The third
model is a Japanese-style corporatist economy. Marer's opinion is that
the East European nations are most likely to emulate the first of these
versions. A social market economy fits more closely the cultural atti
tudes and social vision of these peoples than with the other models.
Marer argues that all successful market systems of whatever type
exhibit a common set of institutional traits that are the source of their
success. These include private ownership of the means of production,
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the presence of strong competition and freedom of trade, a strong and
convertible currency, an efficient system of financial intermediation,
avoidance of prohibitive taxation, adequate infrastructure including
environmental protection, a pluralist and stable political system, and
the freedom to pursue personal goals.
In contrast, Marer observes that the legacy of the socialist experi
ments of Eastern Europe and the USSR is devoid of almost all of these
features that effective market systems require. Marer's essay, therefore,
concentrates discussion upon matters of institutional change and the
creation of new institutions as the primary focus of the transition pro
cess. His essay surveys the current state of affairs with regard to the
above-mentioned institutional structure in the East European nations.
In each case he describes the legacy of the previous system and the
major obstacles facing institutional change, and he offers suggestions
for various "transformation options"—the pros and cons of alternative
transition strategies. The essay concludes with discussion of strategic
issues such as timing and the speed of reforms and the potential role of
western aid in the transition process.
The paper by Abram Bergson shifts the focus to consideration of
economic reforms in the Soviet Union. Bergson's paper provides us
with a sort of "report card" or progress report on reforms in the Gor
bachev era in that it indicates the nature of the reforms initiated and
examines the difficulties produced as a consequence of those efforts.
Bergson begins by examining the pre-Gorbachev structure of the econ
omy and its performance. He identifies the impetus to perestroika as
stemming from recognition of increasing stagnation of the rate of eco
nomic growth relative to earlier periods and to that of the West.
Bergson points out that Gorbachev's initial response to these diffi
culties was to propose a restructuring of industrial planning which
sought to substitute market forces for bureaucratic control in the area
of enterprise operation. He reports that little actual change resulted
from this attempt, a result which he attributes to the continued domi
nance of "state orders" in guiding production, bureaucratic opposition,
lack of financial discipline, and the lack of a real price system.
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Bergson also surveys the results of other elements of perestroika
such as changes in property relations and the legalization of private
enterprise. Here again Bergson indicates that the changes have met
with rather limited success, though the growth of cooperatives appears
to be an encouraging sign. Bergson identifies onerous taxation, ideo
logical hostility, and the distortive effects of the material supply system
and Soviet prices as primary obstacles to the growth of private enter
prise.
Bergson devotes particular attention to the circumstances of the
breakdown of the consumer goods market. He points out that while the
consumer market has seldom worked well, its current status is nothing
short of disastrous. The culprit Bergson identifies is a burgeoning gov
ernment budget deficit which has pumped a considerable amount of
purchasing power into a market already chronically in a state of excess
demand. This has led to unfortunate side effects, including a "falling
off of interest in work."
Bergson finds the lack of success of perestroika not too surprising,
given the immensity of the task and the short period of time that has
elapsed, though there is clearly an undercurrent of criticism by Berg
son of the manner in which the reforms were instituted. One gets a
sense that he feels "mismanagement" or lack of conceptual vision on
the part of Gorbachev contributed to the current situation. He rather
diplomatically asks "whether, with more skillful management at the
highest level, a more favorable outcome might not have been achiev
able."
Joseph Berliner offers us a perspective on the origins on Gor
bachev's reform efforts. Berliner's key insight is his characterization of
perestroika as a "revolution from above." He reports that Soviet eco
nomic reforms, unlike those of Eastern Europe, stemmed originally not
from a state of crisis or impending collapse, or even from widespread
dissatisfaction of the common man. Rather, the impetus for reform
arose initially from the "enlightened wing" of Communist leadership
which was concerned primarily about the effects of long-term trends of
lower growth rates and feeble technical progress.

4 Introduction

The fact that perestroika was imposed from the top down rather than
bubbling up from below explains, Berliner tells us, some of its charac
teristic features and peculiarities. Among those features, Berliner sin
gles out three as being of particular importance. Perestroika has been
actively opposed by a number of groups including workers and bureau
crats who felt threatened by the changes. Hence, perestroika has never
had widespread popular support to invigorate it. A second effect has
been a sort of aimless drift of the reform process. Those who initiated
the reforms were members of a group that had never seriously ques
tioned the overall effectiveness of the central planning mechanism and
had therefore never considered alternatives to that basic framework.
Last, Berliner identifies the rationale of glasnost and its connection to
perestroika as arising from the same seed. He asserts that Gorbachev
recognized that reforms that would need to be carried out by the party
and the economic bureaucracy would be sabotaged; hence, these
groups could not be counted upon to promote reform efforts. Glasnost
thus was something of a propaganda campaign designed to discredit
the existing system and its defenders and elicit popular support for
reform.
Though Berliner's essay goes to considerable length to describe the
disruption of the economy produced by perestroika and the political
obstacles to solutions, one nonetheless is able to detect an occasional
note of optimism in his assessment of the longer term possibilities. He
sees the development of the cooperative movement and the emergence
of entrepreneurial endeavors as hopeful signs of a "grass roots" move
ment that may be "the foundation for a subsequent major transforma
tion of the economy."
While Bergson's and Berliner's essays seek to survey the overall
impact of perestroika, Paul Gregory's paper narrows our focus to con
sideration of the role of an institution of key importance in this pro
cess—the Soviet economic bureaucracy.
Gregory characterizes perestroika as having proceeded in a series of
stages or steps. The first stage comprising the first three to four years of
Gorbachev's leadership was characterized by rather naive thinking on
the part of Soviet leaders who thought that their long-term economic
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decline could be reversed by relatively minor reforms of the existing
economic mechanism. The second stage, beginning about 1988-89,
resulted from Gorbachev's recognition that the beliefs guiding reform
in stage one were wrong. During stage two, Gorbachev sought to
weaken bureaucratic control over the economy by a series of legisla
tive actions as well as by a campaign designed to discredit bureaucrats.
The third stage, which for a long time Gorbachev seemed to wish to
hold in abeyance but which in light of recent events can no longer be
prevented, includes the more radical reforms leading to a full-fledged
market economy.
Gregory's paper deals primarily with the opposition to reform
mounted during stage two by bureaucrats. He points out that bureau
crats, who exhibited a natural antipathy toward the reform movement
because of its impact upon their power and prestige, mounted their
own propaganda campaign which proposed to demonstrate that delay
or avoidance of reforms was in the public interest. Gregory's discus
sions with bureaucrats reveal that their opposition stems from concerns
not only about their own situation but also about the disruptive impacts
of the reforms.
Gregory points out that bureaucratic arguments, while based upon
relevant concerns—inflation will result, monopolies may arise, etc.—
often fail to consider that the reforms will, in the long run, produce a
more efficient system. In particular, Gregory finds fault with Soviet
bureaucrats' reluctance to consider that policies might be instituted to
deal with the unfortunate effects of reform. For instance, while the
privatization of the economy might well lead to the creation of monop
oly power, bureaucratic planners would "plan" for competition through
the creation of additional firms by the state rather than developing anti
trust law and fostering competition through removing barriers to entry.
Many of the difficulties with bureaucratic arguments he traces to wide
spread misunderstanding of the role of prices and of market forces in
general.
Gregory demonstrates that as a result of Gorbachev's efforts at dis
crediting the bureaucracy, much of the old command system has been
broken down without its replacement by market institutions. The result
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has been an even more chaotic environment, and an unfortunate sideeffect has been that the resulting chaos has been attributed to marketization reforms rather than to the collapse of the planning system.
Herbert Levine's essay on the transition process points out a unique
feature of the socialist reform efforts—the lack of a theory or model of
the transition process. Reformers in the socialist nations can observe
the features of market economies which serve as something of a blue
print for their efforts, but they have little clear guidance about how to
bring such institutional structures into existence in their own countries.
The situation is akin to that of a person armed with a blueprint of a
"dream home," but without any carpentry skills.
Levine argues that there are two factors of key importance in the
transition process: the interrelatedness of the changes that have to be
made and the requirement of simultaneity in their imposition. Levine
points out that even simple changes in one aspect of the economy will
require a mushrooming of changes in other areas to accommodate it.
Levine cites the example of the desire to change the responsiveness of
Soviet managers as a case in point. In order to change managers'
behavior they must be given the power to make a whole range of deci
sions about the use of labor, materials, and machinery. But giving man
agers such power requires elimination of the system of central material
supply, the creation of the right to hire and fire workers, and the right to
select technologies and acquire capital, which in turn requires the cre
ation of a banking system based on a new set of lending principles. The
process requires an effective price system and macroeconomic stability
as well, in order for these decisions to lead to desirable results.
Levine argues that for these reforms to be effective, they must take
place more or less simultaneously. This is of course a result of the
interrelatedness factor just discussed. Changes in one part of the econ
omy are dependent on changes having been made elsewhere before
they can proceed. Undertaking all of these changes simultaneously
raises the probability of significant disequilibria occurring.
The final essay in the series, by Josef Brada, directs our attention
toward the transition problems specific to the countries of Eastern
Europe. Brada informs us that these countries are currently involved in
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three related processes. These include the long-run process of trans
forming the economy into some form of market system, the short-run
process of eliminating the macroeconomic disturbances caused by the
transition process, and the process of rejoining the world economy.
Brada states that these three processes interact with one another "often
in ways that seem unpredictable to policymakers and that are not
clearly understood by the population." Brada surveys each of these
processes indicating the major conceptual issues and problems arising
in each of these areas. He examines the specifics of the cases of Hun
gary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
A major theme of Brada's paper is the limited window of opportu
nity available to political leaders in dealing with the range of problems
that the transition process has thrust upon them. After years of listening
to the unfulfilled promises of their Communist leaders, they are now
impatient and unlikely to rally to leaders who promise a better future at
the cost of still more current sacrifice. Indeed, this may be the toughest
problem of all faced by the countries involved in this process.
As noted in the beginning of this introduction, these essays are
based on lectures presented over the course of the 1990-91 school year.
Obviously, tremendous changes have taken place in the former Soviet
Union during the interim between the writing of the papers and their
appearance here in print. The essays continue to inform, however, as
they illuminate factors at work in the past and identify still unresolved
issues. They reflect the opinions of some of the most knowledgeable of
analysts of the Soviet economy at a particular point in time, and pro
vide a backdrop for developments as they continue to unfold. I believe
they will continue to provide us with valuable insights about the pro
cess of economic reform in these nations and add to the historical
record of that period in the reform process.

Roadblocks to Changing
Economic Systems
in Eastern Europe
Paul Marer
Indiana University
Paper presented
September 19,1990

The eight "socialist" or former socialist countries of Central, East
ern, and Southern Europe can be divided into two groups of four
nations: those in which the body politic has made a seemingly firm
commitment to become a market economy (the German Democratic
Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland); and those in which
the body politic has not (or not yet) made such a commitment and still
believes that some kind of a third way of "market socialism," a system
that combines central planning and the market, is feasible (Bulgaria,
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania). To be sure, Yugoslavia is difficult
to classify since Slovenia and Croatia have a strong preference to join
the first group, but the other republics are not willing to go along with
their choice. The USSR would belong to the second group, although
there too not all republics see eye-to-eye on this issue.
This essay is about the nature and problems of the transition faced
by the countries that appear to have made a commitment to become
full-fledged market economies. (Why their commitment is dubbed
"apparent" will be explained later.) The next section identifies the three
main models of successful market economies. It is important for those
of us in the West who wish to advise policymakers in Central and East
ern Europe on transition to a market economy, and for policymakers in
those countries working on transition problems who wish to learn from
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the experiences of successful market economies to recognize that in
different historical, social, political, cultural, and economic environ
ments, alternative institutional arrangements and policies can be suc
cessful. This suggests caution in seeking to duplicate some particular
feature of another country's economic system.
After focusing on the differences between market economy systems,
the essay identifies and discusses briefly those system features and
causal relationships that successful market economies appear to have
in common. Assuming that the factors identified are the right ones, I
venture the hypothesis that successful transition programs in Central
and Eastern Europe will be those that can duplicate just those system
features and policies that seem to account for the successes among the
market economy countries, irrespective of the economic, social, cul
tural, and political differences among them.
Next, I examine the economic legacies inherited by the new govern
ments in Central and Eastern Europe, following the framework pre
sented in the previous section. The purpose is to try to identify the
nature and size of the gap between what is and what should be, a gap
that transition programs should attempt to close. On each set of issues I
discuss the main policy options and make recommendations.
The concluding part of the essay offers some thoughts on the strat
egy of transition, calls attention to the immense intellectual, economic,
and political difficulties of transition, and speculates about policy
implications for the United States and the West.

Models of Successful Market Economies
As I see it, there are three main models of successful market econo
mies: the West European social market economy, the U.S. consumer
market economy, and the Japanese corporatist market economy. Let
me describe briefly the main differences among them. 1
Although there are vast differences even among the countries of
Western Europe, the successful European paradigm is best exemplified
by the social market economy of Germany. There is an unquestioned
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commitment to the predominance of market forces and of private prop
erty; "social market" simply means a recognition that an unbridled
market has imperfections and that it is the state's responsibility to rec
tify them. The state is responsible for sound monetary and fiscal poli
cies (a task that successive German governments have met in
particularly exemplary fashion), allowing relatively free foreign com
petition on the domestic market (with agriculture being the most nota
ble exception); efficient infrastructure, some attention to the
environment; adequate health care, education, and the right of just
about all citizens to decent (which in some cases means subsidized)
housing; job security for the large majority of the workforce (that has
parallels with the U.S. Civil Service); and substantial government pro
grams to help the unemployed and the poor.
The basic idea of a social market economy is making capitalism
more humane in order to sustain political support for the system, but
not to interfere with market forces so much as to lose the efficiency
gains of capitalism. The line between what the private sector provides
via the interplay of market forces and what the state provides as a mat
ter of political right is, to some extent, blurred. Germany's economic
performance (as well as that of the other West European countries) has
been helped by the willingness of its people to save and to work hard,
traits that to a degree are culturally determined.
In Germany, as in the other countries of (especially Northern)
Europe, the social and business infrastructures are excellent, the cities
are generally more livable than those in the United States, and there
exists only a relatively small underclass of "have not" persons. But it
should not be forgotten that these achievements came relatively
recently, not early in the period of postwar reconstruction and expan
sion. Behind the success is decades of painful sacrifice, initially includ
ing high unemployment. Furthermore, Europe's property rights under
the current system are much less entrepreneurial and adaptive than
property rights under the U.S. system. The most revealing evidence for
this is their highly disparate rates of growth in long-term job creation.
To be sure, Europe's problems are being addressed by the 1992 process
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of economic integration, which borrows some of the best features of
the American system.
As an aside, note that the difference between a German-type social
market economy and the "market socialism" ideas in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union is fundamental. Although there is no precise or
fully agreed to definition of market socialism, its advocates believe that
the introduction of limited market forces can help preserve an eco
nomic system in which the means of production should remain pre
dominantly nonprivate, the government should play a substantial role
in directing economic activities, and the distribution of income and
wealth should be relatively egalitarian. Market socialism often entails
giving workers a substantial role in management. Advocates of market
socialism are suspicious, often for ideological reasons, of capitalism
and of markets; market socialism is their terminal of retreat in the face
of the proven basic faults of a centrally planned economic system.2
The U.S. model, termed a consumer market economy, assigns a
powerful role to the pull and push market forces (and only a minor role
to the government) to promote economic growth through adaptation.
The entrepreneurial spirit is vigorous and the mobility of the factors of
production, including labor, is high. The efficiency of the market is
praised and government interference is criticized (although reality is
not as extreme as the image). To be sure, long-run market efficiency is
probably impaired by the often short-term horizons of corporations, the
get-rich-quick schemes chased by many entrepreneurs, and by the inor
dinate amount of litigation and financial manipulation that are also a
part of the system. Government regulation (and deregulation) typically
targets as the beneficiary the consumer rather than the producer. Social
pressures and government policies promote private consumption over
saving. This preference is reflected not only in individual and corporate
behavior but sometimes also in irresponsibly large deficits in the gov
ernment budget.
Critics note that the U.S. paradigm excessively promotes the virtues
of short-term market efficiency and individual consumption over longterm growth, equity, and addressing social problems. There is an
underprovision of social investment. America's infrastructure has been

Roadblocks to Changing Economic Systems in Eastern Europe

13

deteriorating. And a large underclass, with no stake in the prevailing
economic and social order, has emerged and is being perpetuated.
Japan's paradigm, termed a corporatist market economy, is a partic
ularly successful blend of features rooted in Japan's own environment
and traditions.3 One of its main features is intense competition for
greater market shares rather than for short-term profits. This has led to
long-term thinking and continuous improvements in efficiency, pro
ductivity, and cost-competitiveness, even though the domestic market
has been sheltered—often for long periods, until domestic firms in an
industry have matured fully—from foreign competition. Most Japa
nese firms have a strong commitment to employment security, but not
to the preservation of the specific jobs of individual workers. This, in
turn, has justified large corporate expenditures on retraining programs
and relocation. Together with Japan's rapid rate of growth and the
downward flexibility of wages, these features have contributed to its
enviable record of full employment, flexible market adaptation, and
spectacular economic success.
Perhaps no factor is more important in the Japanese model than its
promotion of an extraordinarily high level of voluntary savings and
investment. These are prompted by the pressures as well as opportuni
ties of its economic system, by its government's policies (providing
large incentives to save and a stable financial framework), as well as by
the traditions of the Japanese culture. There is a close working relation
ship between the government on the one hand and business and labor
unions on the other. The bureaucracy has maintained and uses skill
fully its authority over the private sector, mostly by assisting producers
rather than consumers or labor.
We should not forget that Japan's spectacular success is of relatively
recent fruition; in the later 1950s, its level of development was mea
sured to be on par with those of the USSR and the countries of Eastern
Europe, on average. Japan has achieved what it has today by sacrific
ing consumption over a long period; by working extremely hard,
including the sacrifice of leisure (an attitude that is instilled in early
childhood); and to some extent also by neglecting a bit its infrastruc-
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ture, the environment, and (until recently) the global burdens shoul
dered by other large and economically successful nations.
The newly industrialized countries of Asia (e.g., Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore) have much in common with Japan's para
digm, although no two countries have fully identical economic policies
and systems.
Common Causal Factors
in Successful Market Economies
Although there are major variations in the economic systems and
policies among even the successful capitalist market economies, the
economic systems and policies of such countries appear to have
shared, to a greater or lesser degree, the following essential features.
1. Private Ownership. The means of production are predominantly
privately owned. State-owned enterprises, in some cases accounting
for as much as one-third or more of output, have played a more impor
tant role during the early stages of reconstruction and development,
when unemployment was still high and voluntary savings still low,
than subsequently. State enterprises tend to be more efficient when
they function in a competitive environment than when they are insu
lated. In a competitive environment, state ownership does not automat
ically mean gross inefficiency if the firms receive no subsidies or the
subsidies are given in ways that do not cancel the pressures and
rewards of market forces for the firm. However, since the operation of
state-owned firms is difficult to insulate from political and bureaucratic
pressures, practically all the industrial countries have implemented
programs of privatization in recent years.
2. Competition and Trade. The single most important feature of a
well-functioning market system is strong competition. Countries
whose domestic markets are large enough to accommodate more than a
handful of firms in each industry, such as Japan, could afford to be pro
tectionist and still maintain strong competition. However, countries
that are small or medium-sized must open up to import competition
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and eventually direct foreign investment. Full competition requires
sound and predictable rules and regulations in all areas of production
and trade. It is the government's responsibility to establish and enforce
them, unless industry or trade associations can do the job as well or
better.
3. Sound Currency. One of the essential functions of government is
to provide a sound currency. This means a low rate of inflation and full
convertibility as soon as practicable. The rate of inflation can be kept
manageable only with sound monetary and fiscal policies (for which
there are general guidelines but no precise recipes); the same is also a
precondition for meaningful convertibility. A low rate of inflation and
the expectation that inflation will not get out of hand are necessary to
motivate business firms—as well as households as savers and provid
ers of labor services—to take the long view and to focus on real eco
nomic activities instead of devoting their energies to hoarding,
speculation, and other kinds of manipulation to protect the value of
their assets. Convertibility is essential to link the domestic economy
with the world economy; it facilitates the efficient cross-border flow of
goods, services, and people. No meaningful import competition or
trade along the lines of comparative advantage is likely to take place
without the currency being convertible.
4. Savings, Taxation, Financial Intermediation. An adequate-to-high
level of savings and efficient financial intermediation of the incomes
saved by households (the most important source) and businesses into
productive investments are essential common features of sustained
good economic performance. Efficient investment in physical and
human capital is the engine of technical progress and productivity
improvements. In the long run, all countries must rely on domestic sav
ings to finance an adequate level of domestic investment. Net borrow
ing from abroad can assist a country only temporarily and only on the
margin.
Countries that have reached a certain level of development need a
reasonably sophisticated and competitive banking system. This means
a system that is largely private, with investors risking their own money
and seeking profits. Savers and investors must have at their disposal an
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array of attractive financial instruments (e.g., savings accounts, stocks,
bonds and the like).
The rate of taxation, direct plus indirect, on business profits and per
sonal incomes must not be prohibitive, that is, it must not be so high as
to act as a disincentive to putting forth a strong economic effort by
investors, entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, and workers. There
is no precise figure on what threshold level of taxation begins to seri
ously inhibit economic effort; that depends in part on a country's eco
nomic circumstances and its culture. But a tax burden that is greater
than 50 percent is certain to be constraining; some believe that the
threshold rate is considerably lower.
5. Infrastructure and the Environment. A sound infrastructure (e.g.,
a well-functioning system of telecommunications, an adequate net
work of transportation, good schools, hospitals, and housing) is needed
both for the sake of business efficiency and as a vital contribution to a
decent standard of living. In addition, people increasingly want the
government to help protect the environment. Businesses and people are
generally willing to pay for these benefits through some combination
of user charges and taxes.
6. Opportunities for Individual Fulfillment. Human beings want
opportunities to seek personal fulfillment. This means, first and fore
most, the political and economic freedom to pursue goals as investors,
entrepreneurs, farmers, professionals, and wage- and salary-earners. A
pluralistic and relatively stable political system provides the most sup
portive political environment; economically, the previous paragraphs
summarized much of what is needed. In addition, people want a proper
and well-managed workplace; an equitable system of personal com
pensation and a reasonably fair distribution of income and wealth;
some degree of employment security; and a back-up system of mini
mum income maintenance in case of dismissal, old age, or ill health.
And since more and more of the simple jobs are being automated
(except in the poorest countries), both future employability and per
sonal fulfillment require broad and affordable opportunities for a good
education, including continuous upgrading of skills and retraining.
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The factors just enumerated are strongly interdependent. For exam
ple, competition is not likely to be strong and investment efficient if the
means of production are not predominantly private. The voluntary sav
ings needed for investment are unlikely to be forthcoming if the cur
rency is not sound and the taxes are excessive. Foreign competition
and integration into the world economy are essential; to achieve them,
a convertible currency is needed. These are just a few examples; the
list of linkages is extensive.

Legacies of Socialism, Transformation Operations,
and Recommendations

To judge what it would take to transform the economic systems and
policies of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into systems
that would sustain good economic performance, let us look at the eco
nomic legacies inherited by the new governments, using the preceding
framework. We also highlight the options and problems of transforma
tion, and make recommendations.4
Much of what these countries have inherited in the economic realm,
and also their options for transformation, is similar, but certain differ
ences will be noted. The German Democratic Republic, of course,
stands out as the country whose absorption into a unified Germany
simplifies, first, the intellectual problems of transformation (in terms of
not having to spend time searching for an appropriate kind of eco
nomic model) and, second, financing its huge costs, which will ease
some or much of the pain.
1. Ownership. There are not proven ways to develop efficient and
fully competitive markets and to motivate producers toward efficiency,
customer satisfaction, and innovative behavior in economies where
most of the means of production are state-owned. In Central and East
ern Europe, state- or worker-owned enterprises and large cooperatives
that function similarly account for much of production (agriculture in
Poland and Yugoslavia is an exception) and own an even larger share
of productive assets. Privatization is, therefore, a cornerstone of the
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transformation. As yet, none of these countries has put in place the full
complement of laws and policies that set out firmly the scope, the
speed, and the strategies of privatization.
Privatization faces a number of major constraints.
(i) In Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland earlier reforms have trans
ferred some of the (not always clearly defined) ownership rights to
workers or their elected representatives, in the mistaken belief that this
would improve efficiency. Workers often oppose privatization or object
to terms of the sale that would be acceptable to a private owner. The
two main policy options are to continue to allow workers a say in
privatization or to "renationalize" such enterprises, returning to the
government all rights of ownership. The latter appears to be the pre
ferred solution on economic grounds, but it is politically exceedingly
difficult because it appears to be a step backwards.
(ii) Most businesses will require considerable restructuring before or
after privatization because they are typically overstaffed, lack modern
production and marketing expertise, and cannot raise sufficient capital
in their present state. The arguments for restructuring before privatiza
tion are that it would be politically more acceptable for the government
than for private (especially foreign private) owners to do it, and that
revenues from the sale would be greater. The argument for restructur
ing after privatization is that the state may not have the political will or
know-how to do the job. My view is that the approach must be coun
try-, sector-, and enterprise-specific.
(iii) There is insufficient accumulated domestic private wealth to
find buyers for more than a small fraction of the enterprises to be priva
tized. Those who have capital often have acquired it in ways the popu
lation does not consider legitimate. The main options are (a) to gear the
scope and speed of privatization to the availability of private domestic
and foreign capital; (b) to give every citizen a share in every enterprise,
via holding companies; (c) to finance a portion of the equity acquired
by nationals of the country with a special line of credit; and (d) to make
large sales and/or placements to pension funds, mutual funds, local
governments, insurance companies, nonprofit foundations, and like
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organizations. Each solution has advantages and problems; some com
bination of (c) and (d) would seem to be the best strategy.
(iv) Many sectors of production and distribution are dominated by
monopolies or oligopolies. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the
effects of each privatization on competition.
(v) How should state property offered for sale be valued? One prob
lem is that costs, prices, and the accounting system are arbitrary; a
more fundamental one is that private investors are typically willing to
pay only a price warranted by the firm's existing level of efficiency and
earnings, while the population, the press, and most local politicians
would like the investor to pay for future earnings expected after the
improvements. This is as much a political as an economic debate.
Many are against privatization, whether because of ideology or envy,
and they use economic arguments to support their criticism. A further
problem is that in some of the countries, "sweetheart" deals have been
consummated between management and buyers through "spontane
ous" privatization deals. The recommendation of most experts is that
the only way to assure a fair price is to establish, publicize, and enforce
fair, competitive, and transparent privatization procedures, and then let
the market determine value.
(vi) Should foreign investors receive the same, preferential, or
dispreferential treatment as domestic investors? Most experts agree
that "national" treatment makes the best economic sense, although
simultaneous preferential and dispreferential treatments in certain
areas may be justified, some perhaps on a temporary basis.
(vii) Who should get the proceeds and how should they be used?
The most basic issue is how much of the purchase price should go to
the state and how much should be invested in the enterprise itself? If
all proceeds went to the state, would investors be able to pay also for
the cost of restructuring? Would that not reduce too much the incentive
to bid? But if all or most proceeds went to the enterprise purchased, the
investor would then "buy itself and the state would get little. It seems
that no generalized solution can be recommended. The government's
revenues from privatization (outright sale, down payments, and debt
service) should be used mainly to reduce the government's domestic
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and foreign debt; a modest share should be contributed to a revolving
fund to provide credits for the start-up and expansion of private busi
ness ventures.
In sum, privatization faces immense economic and political dilem
mas. There are many additional and extremely difficult issues we did
not even touch upon, such as handling of the liabilities of an enterprise
when only some of its assets are sold, the issues of compensation to
owners expropriated after the war, and the privatization of land and
housing. All privatization issues are extremely sensitive politically.
Most political positions can be justified with economic arguments,
some more sound than others. It is worth noting that while the privati
zation experiences of market economies can offer helpful insights, in
Central and Eastern Europe the process has to take place on a much
larger scale and in an environment in which much of the capital and
many of the essential supporting institutions are inadequate or nonex
istent.
2. Competition and Trade. In the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) countries, central planning has replaced the mar
ket as the main mechanism of resource allocation. The markets that
remained or have emerged, mostly in certain consumer goods and ser
vices, are functioning inefficiently, especially in the countries where
central planning is still pervasive. The chief problem is market seg
mentation. In some countries most goods and services, in other coun
tries many, are distributed at state-controlled prices and are in short
supply. Consequently, all kinds of nonprice mechanisms of allocation
have emerged. Therefore, the markets that do operate typically embody
large "spillover" effects. This means that the "free" prices on those
markets are often much higher than would normally be justified
because the money that cannot be spent on the many goods and ser
vices that buyers would really have liked to purchase "spills over" into
demand for those goods and services that happen to be available. Even
in Hungary and Yugoslavia, where past reforms have made planning
and the market theoretically coexist and jointly determine resource
allocation, the new governments have inherited situations in which the

Roadblocks to Changing Economic Systems in Eastern Europe 21

bureaucratic direction of the economy has remained dominant, even if
the instruments used are not those of direct central planning.
The quick freeing of the prices of most goods and services is ham
pered by the high degree of monopolization of the domestic markets,
because norms of fair competition are not well defined, by the almost
complete absence of import competition (except in Hungary since
1989 and Poland since 1990), and the prevailing mechanism of intraCMEA trade.
Creating and maintaining competition requires that the following
steps be taken, more or less simultaneously.
(i) Adopt a program of deconcentration (coupled, whenever possi
ble, with privatization) that breaks up those monopolies where techni
cal and economic considerations allow it and where import
competition is weak or absent.
(ii) Promote the establishment and growth of small and mediumsized enterprises.
(iii) Establish sound competition policies and institutions, based on
freedom to acquire property, for the business firms to enjoy unre
stricted entry into and exit from the market, and for labor to freely
migrate within the country. Adopt transparent norms of unfair competi
tion, with effective mechanisms for enforcement.
(iv) Create an economic, financial, and legal framework that pro
motes the development of market forces. Especially important is the
creation of efficient capital markets.
(v) Announce a program and timetable for reducing most subsidies.
In the enterprise sector, this should be coupled with imposing greater
financial discipline on firms and exposing them to domestic and inter
national competition.
(vi) Reform the system of wage determination. One legacy that is
highly problematic is that up to one-half of an average wage-earner's
total compensation has been paid in the form of free or subsidized
goods and services. If subsidies are to be reduced and real incomes are
not to decline precipitously, wages and salaries must be adjusted
upward. This complicates the problem of wage determination (which is
already troublesome because of the absence of real owners to resist
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unjustified demands for wage increases; their place is taken by bureau
cratic regulation). When can wages be allowed to be fully marketdetermined and whether and how to create a level playing field of
wage-setting between state-owned and private firms are two of the
many difficult strategic issues of transition.
(vii) Change the existing mechanisms of intra-CMEA trade and
finance because a system in which governments direct enterprises in
what to export and import is not compatible with a market system, nor
is the settlement of transactions in transferrable rubles (TR). In June
1990, the Soviet Union abrogated its network of bilateral agreements
to settle its transactions in TR and proposed switching to dollars. This
change will almost certainly be introduced next year. Much more diffi
cult is delegating trading decisions to enterprises. Given the Soviet
Union's prevailing system and growing economic crisis, it is not
inclined to alter the existing arrangements. While in principle it is pos
sible for an East European government to tell its domestic enterprises
that they must sink or swim on their own in trading with the Soviets,
the impact of such a change on the volume and composition of trade
would be very uncertain. To be sure, the economic crisis in the Soviet
Union and elsewhere in the CMEA, and the pressures to reorient a sig
nificant part of intra-CMEA trade to the world market are, in any
event, causing huge shocks and uncertainties for these economies, irre
spective of what happens to their system of trading. It is paradoxical
that while changing the system of trade would add new uncertainties
and burdens in the short run, such a change is in fact unavoidable if a
country wants to respond effectively to the crisis in intra-CMEA trade.
(viii) Import liberalization of convertible-currency trade must be the
centerpiece of programs creating a competitive economy, allowing
prices to be market-determined, promoting exports, and improving the
gains from trade. The existing system of mostly implicit quotas and
other administrative restrictions must be transformed into tariffs and
exchange rate-based "controls" on imports. Import liberalization will
be easier in countries like Hungary and Yugoslavia that, over the years,
have introduced significant reforms in foreign trade by weakening and
eventually disbanding the state's monopoly of foreign trade and by
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granting foreign trading rights to a growing number of business enti
ties.
3. Sound Currency. One of the legacies of a socialist system is per
vasive shortages, which means repressed inflation. Shortage is caused
by two distinct phenomena. One is the unavailability of goods and ser
vices in the right quantities or assortment, or at the time or place
needed, i.e., poor matching of demand and supply at micro levels
because markets function so poorly. This kind of shortage is largely the
result of the economic system. In certain countries, especially in Yugo
slavia and Hungary, the reforms introduced in the 1960s were able to
reduce shortage but not eliminate it.
The more traditional source of repressed inflation is the result of
excess money and credit creation cum price controls. The pace of
money and credit creation is a policy decision that is not linked closely
to the economic system. In recent years, policymakers in Poland,
Yugoslavia and the USSR have sinned the most and consequently, by
1990, have come to face the most difficult dilemmas of what to do. If
inflation—whether repressed or open—is high, that causes severe dam
age to the economy for reasons that are too well known to be listed.
But wringing out inflation is exceedingly difficult, economically as
well as politically, since it involves some combination of large though
temporary price increases and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies
which cause bankruptcies and unemployment.
Poland has implemented a drastic policy of stabilization. The Balcerowicz program, introduced January 1, 1990, opted for: the rapid
elimination of the budget deficit through large cuts in subsidies and
other kinds of spending; a very tight monetary policy, initially involv
ing large interest rate increases to restrain credit demand and to create
incentives for saving; the closure of unprofitable enterprises, thereby
abandoning job security; restricting wage increases to a fraction of the
rate of inflation; the virtual elimination of all price controls (except
energy and housing); and introducing resident zloty convertibility.
At the time of writing (July 1990), it is too soon to give a definitive
assessment of the Balcerowicz program. The economy that the new
government had inherited was in such a deep crisis that something
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drastic had to be done, so shock therapy was perhaps unavoidable. But
is obvious (by hindsight as well as foresight) that in Soviet-type econo
mies, inflation is even more difficult to control than in market econo
mies, and for several reasons.
(i) Commercial banks in a Soviet-type economy do not respond to
tight monetary policy the way banks do in a market economy. One leg
acy of the system is that banks do not, as a rule, push enterprises into
bankruptcy if their loans are "nonperforming." When the commercial
banks were established (in most countries during the last few years, by
separating out a part of the former monobank that performed both cen
tral and commercial banking functions), they were given an arbitrary
portfolio of assets (outstanding loans to enterprises) and liabilities
(enterprise deposits) without sufficient reserves to write off the bad
loans. And the authorities cannot afford to push into bankruptcy the
handful of banks that do operate in these countries.
(ii) The alternative, that of the banks foreclosing on enterprises, is
also not practiced. Given the arbitrary nature of costs and prices and
the state-imposed supply responsibilities on producers, firms that are
loss-making or illiquid are not necessarily those that are truly the worst
performers. Even in countries such as Hungary and Yugoslavia where
the problem of arbitrary pricing has been improved substantially by
reforms, many enterprises are in a monopoly or oligopoly situation.
They claim, perhaps with some justification, that their production is
essential for supplying the domestic or convertible-currency markets.
Given the precarious status of these countries' balances of payments,
the threat that their production will be replaced with imports unless
they shape up is not credible.
(iii) The way enterprises get around tight monetary policy is "credit
queuing." When firms cannot obtain direct financing, they sell to each
other on credit. The second enterprise may be unable to pay as well
because it is de facto bankrupt or because it has itself given pseudo
credits to other enterprises, and so on down the line (or "queue"). In a
market economy, where enterprises have real owners, there are eco
nomic incentives for a creditor to force a nonpaying debtor into bank
ruptcy, or for the debtor to voluntarily declare himself bankrupt. In a
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socialist economy, nobody has an economic interest in bankruptcy, or
cares if unsound business practices further dissipate the value of an
enterprise's assets.
(iv) The only way around these problems (before real owners are
found and market institutions are created, which will take time) is for
the authorities to institute draconian measures and to let the chips fall
where they may. This is what Balcerowicz has done in Poland. But
enterprises—not being accustomed to such pressures and not having
much experience in how to be flexible, cut costs, and find and adapt to
the requirements of new markets—tend to be paralyzed. In the lingo of
economists, their supply response is weak. In the meantime, produc
tion declines precipitously and unemployment jumps.
The problems just enumerated are not just those of Poland and the
countries that must deal with a large stock of excess money and credit.
These are problems for all countries during their early stages of transi
tion to a market economy. They too are finding (or will find) it difficult
to control the strong inflationary pressures that are generated by:
—reductions of subsidies and the freeing of prices in an economy
where producers face insufficient competition;
—increases in nominal wages (including the substitution of subsi
dies by money wages);
—depreciation of the real exchange rate;
—having to finance the terms of trade losses with the USSR as the
CMEA moves to convertible-currency settlement;
—servicing large foreign debts, which reduces domestic supply; and
—increased inflationary expectations.
Thus, it is easy to say that sound money is needed for an economy to
perform well, but realize it is very difficult as pressures for substantial
price inflation increase and are notably difficult to control.
Although the policy dilemmas are somewhat different in countries
where inflationary pressures are very large versus those where they are
most moderate, the essential policy question is still whether to try to
get inflation out of the way quickly by a more or less once-and-for-all
increase in the price level (bunching together as many as possible of
the factors that account for inflation), which involves a willingness to
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suffer the political price and run the risk that inflation may get out of
control altogether, or restrict prices to increase more gradually, which
makes the process more protracted and the medicine perhaps less
effective.
In either case, it is essential that no time be lost by the authorities in
creating or strengthening those monetary, banking, and financial insti
tutions and instruments that are essential for monetary policy to be
effective.
Sound money also means a convertible currency. There are many
different kinds of convertibility: for residents and nonresidents, for the
enterprise and the household sectors, and for current- versus capitalaccount transactions. Most important, I believe, are (a) that domestic
enterprises be able to buy the foreign currency to pay for imports; (b)
that foreign investors be able to convert their local earnings and repa
triate the capital invested; and (c) that foreign tourists could readily
obtain the local currency at a single exchange rate and that the inflow
be channeled (via the authorities or via a foreign exchange market) into
imports and debt service rather than into the mattresses or foreign bank
accounts of currency speculators.
Should the exchange rate be fully market-determined by letting it
float; should the authorities fix the rate and try to maintain it; or should
they opt for an intermediate solution, such as frequent but small adjust
ments?
The main advantages of the floating rate are that the authorities need
not maintain large reserves and that there will be a single exchange rate
in the economy. Its disadvantage is that under conditions that typically
prevail in these countries during the early stages of transformation, the
market will assign an extremely low value to their currencies relative
to their purchasing power. This makes not only exports but domestic
assets also very cheap to foreigners. That, in turn, creates or exacer
bates the political problem of foreign investment and also feeds infla
tion.
The advantage of a fixed exchange rate (depending on where the
rate is set) is that it mitigates the above problems. Its disadvantage is
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that fixed rates are not possible to maintain without economic policies
that support them, and without adequate reserves.
Poland, as part of its program of economic stabilization and liberal
ization, decided on a very substantial devaluation, eliminating the huge
difference between the official and grey market rates, and then trying
to keep the rate fixed. Hungary also has a fixed exchange rate regime,
periodically adjusted for inflation differentials, but its official rate val
ues the forint significantly higher than the rate prevailing on the paral
lel (grey) market, so it has a de facto multiple exchange rate system.
4. Savings, Taxation, Financial Intermediation. One legacy is the
very large share of the German Democratic Party that is channeled
through public coffers—60 to 65 percent—which of course has to be
covered by taxes. Extensive redistribution in the form of transfers and
subsidies to and from enterprises and households is the main reason
why the share is so high.
The net voluntary savings of households (the sector that throughout
the world provides the bulk of savings) is much lower in socialist econ
omies than in market economies for the following reasons.
—The share of personal income in the total income of the popula
tion is low because too much is distributed centrally.
—The share of personal income saved is also lower than in compa
rable market economies because, until now, governments have
provided full pensions, free education and health care, and job
security. International studies of what motivates household sav
ings show that the precautionary motive (the individual's desire
to weave a personal safety net) is the most important. Therefore,
one reason that governments in Central and Eastern Europe need
to substantially reduce their cradle-to-grave systems of support is
to encourage voluntary savings; another, of course, is that many
of those programs are dysfunctional and too costly to be afford
able without imposing prohibitively high individual and business
taxes.
—In some of the countries the level of household debt is very high
because automatic entitlements to subsidized loans for housing
have created the incentive to assume the largest possible moit-
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gages. In Hungary, for example, housing subsidies alone (mostly
on the interest rate) consume 15 percent of the central budget
—Real (or perceived) interest rates on household savings have been
negative until recently, in all the countries; it is still the case in
some of the countries.
—The absence of opportunities to buy stocks, mutual funds, and
other financial and real assets has reduced the incentive to save
for investment purposes.
In such systems, much of the economy's large savings is generated
by way of very high direct and indirect taxes. For example, Hungary
today has a 53 percent payroll tax (43 percent paid by the employer
and 10 percent by the employee), a 50 percent marginal income tax
rate, a 40 percent corporate profits tax, a value-added tax of up to 25
percent, plus many additional specific excise taxes. The government
then decides, politically and bureaucratically, how to allocate its large
revenues. This helps explain why these economies have such notori
ously low efficiency of investment.
The main objective of fiscal policy during the transition should be to
reduce significantly the tax burden on producers and households while,
at the same time, balancing the budget. To encourage capital forma
tion, retained earnings should be taxed at significantly lower rates than
distributed earnings, and savings and capital gains should be granted
preferential tax rates. Other exemptions should be reduced and the tax
systems restructured to conform to international standards.
There is an urgent need in all these countries to strengthen the finan
cial system by allowing much greater scope for competing private
financial intermediaries, including foreign-owned ones. Private finan
cial intermediaries are essential for improving the efficiency of invest
ment allocation. There is a role for governmental institutions and
programs, but they too should be run in a businesslike fashion.
5. Infrastructure and the Environment. Two areas where the allpowerful governments of the socialist countries should have outper
formed their counterparts in market economies are building and main
taining infrastructure and protecting the environment. How
paradoxical that especially in these areas all the centrally planned
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economies governments have performed so disgracefully poorly. The
extent of environmental degradation is immeasurably worse in Eastern
than in Western Europe. This is explained partly by the priority placed
on development of mining, metallurgy, the chemical sector, and other
heavy industries, and partly by simple inattention. Infrastructure has
also been neglected One reason for the worsening crises in these econ
omies is that by now they have "used up" much of the infrastructure
inherited from before the war.
It is urgent that environmental regulations be tightened and enforced
and that a long-term program of clean-up be adopted and financed,
partly from external sources. Practical considerations suggest that
infrastructure should be opened up to foreign investment since the bud
gets of these countries are simply not in a position to devote the
resources needed to develop and maintain infrastructure at the desired
level of efficiency.
6. Individual Fulfillment. It was already mentioned that one of the
legacies is a cradle-to-grave system of social programs. This seemingly
attractive public aim has turned out to stifle personal responsibility and
to generate a large bureaucracy and many regulations, with a great deal
of corruption and waste. The transformation must begin with a recog
nition that governments cannot fulfill people's lives through pervasive
interference, however well-intentioned. Governments' responsibility is
to create a stable economic and political environment and the confi
dence-inspiring institutions that permit individuals to fulfill their own
lives.
Although it is up to each country to adopt the kind of social support
systems it wants and can pay for, the direction of the needed changes
includes the following.
—Subsidies for consumer goods and services should be reduced or
eliminated.
—Housing, which in most countries represents a huge and unsus
tainable drain on the state budget and causes serious distortions in
fiscal and monetary policies, needs to be privatized and much of
it commercially operated. Unsustainable terms of outstanding
mortgages must be changed.
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—Only a minimum level of pension should be compulsory and
operated by a government agency; private pension systems
should supplement it.
—Retirement ages should be adjusted to reflect demographic reali
ties, the country's labor force needs, and ability to pay the state's
pension obligations.
—To improve the efficiency of health care delivery, the cost of rou
tine medical services and related prescription drugs should be
reimbursed only in part, except for patients with very low
incomes. Privately operated health care should be allowed to
compete with socialized health care as an incentive to provide
high-quality service at affordable prices (more or less the Cana
dian system).
—The above-recommended changes in programs, together with the
elimination of job security for all, will require the establishment
of a new kind of social safety net which should rest on two pil
lars: unemployment compensation and assistance to the needy.
—The systems of education as well as training must be changed, for
the sake of better individual fulfillment and also to prepare the
kind of labor force their economies need today and even more in
the future. In all these countries, access to higher education is
much too exclusive and restricted. The proportion of young peo
ple in secondary and especially in tertiary education is much
lower than in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries and it must be raised. Today's curriculum
(in education as well as in training) tends to prepare for skills that
are defined too narrowly and are often obsolete. The curriculum
must be broadened, putting more emphasis on basic skills, inter
disciplinary studies, communications, and greater individual
choice of courses and flexibility of thinking.
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Conclusions and Implications for Western Policy
Transition involves changes in the economic system, strategic eco
nomic decisions, and economic policy choices.
The most important strategic decision is the sequencing and speed
of transition. In countries that face an unusually large macroeconomic
disequilibrium, the highest priority must be given to stabilization. This
may require what in popular parlance is known as shock treatment.
Immediate attention must be paid also to introduce those reforms in the
institutional framework that are needed to make stabilization policies
effective.
One of the great unknowns is whether it is possible to significantly
improve economic efficiency as long as most enterprises remain stateowned and partly worker-managed. The only option is to try, since
there is no easy and quick solution to privatization. The key must be to
design and then hold firmly to a program, with a timetable, that intro
duces greater competition and eliminates the hope for case-by-case
state support for the enterprises that are failing.
Concerning the pace of systemic transformation, the place for cau
tion is at the policy deliberation phase, weighing the alternatives, the
likelihood of achieving intended and unintended consequences,
sequencing choices, and modes of implementation. Measures should
be packaged into large bundles because the economy operates as an
organic whole and not as an unrelated collection of bits and pieces.
Packaged into large bundles, the linkages in the system can be relied
upon to effectively enhance every other action.
Moving rapidly also makes political sense: to prevent a consensus
that forms immediately after the elections from dissipating before a
large package of measures is implemented and results become evi
dent—probably a minimum of two to three years. Any large program,
such as privatization and foreign economic liberalization, will take
years to implement, even at maximum speed.
Agreements with the international and regional organizations, such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 24, and the
European Community, can help a government sell a tough program
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domestically by holding out the promise of such economic benefits
linked to program implementation as, for example, some type of asso
ciation with the European Community. International agreements can
also enhance the government's credibility that its program will be
implemented.
Credibility also means not raising unrealistic expectations. If gov
ernment policies lack credibility, are hesitant, are full of unworkable
compromises, then managers and individuals will refuse to change
their behavior to fit the new policies. This, itself, can undermine trans
formation. For certain countries, such actions also undermine interna
tional creditworthiness.
Tremendous obstacles stand in the way of governments following
the suggestions outlined in this essay. In some countries, the first prob
lem is that of insufficient credible and mobilizable expertise to design
good programs. Even in countries where the requisite expertise can be
found (e.g., in Hungary), there is this question: will the experts—many
of whom have cooperated with the previous and rather liberal Commu
nist governments and/or are associated with one of the opposition par
ties that is not a member of the governing coalition—be listened to by
the authorities or be pushed aside as "politically unreliable"? There are
signs that this is happening, which is a great pity. None of these coun
tries has a second set of first-rate experts waiting in the wings, as there
are in the industrial countries.
The most fundamental constraints are political. Throughout the
region, the population has high expectations that changing the political
system will bring about quick economic improvements. Democratic
elections, with new and old parties competing for power, tend to rein
force these expectations with promises that are unrealistic. In some
cases the promises are made because politicians do not understand the
situation, in others out of sheer demagoguery. To make matters even
more difficult, there are many politically influential persons who still
believe in their heart of hearts that some kind of a third road is a viable
option and behind the scenes are pushing the policymakers to take it.
Not infrequently, such persons hide behind market economy slogans.
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Newly elected politicians in all these Central and Eastern European
countries face an extremely difficult and unpleasant situation. They
have inherited the sorry legacies of the previous regime. These legacies
require the new governments to take a series of tough actions. Most
have unpleasant consequences for the economic well-being of the pop
ulation, and thus for political stability in the short run. Hie fruits of
those actions will ripen only years later, perhaps after the next, or after
the next-to-the-next, election. It is realistic to expect that wise states
men are (or will soon be) governing these countries? This essay began
with a statement that the body politic in four of the countries has made
a seemingly firm commitment to become a market economy. Yes, they
genuinely want to become like the social market economies of Western
Europe. But this does not mean that they are also willing to take the
tough steps that will lead there.
I have only a single thought concerning Western policy toward these
countries. We should give them substantial economic help, but tie our
assistance to tough and internationally well-coordinated conditionality.
Some energy should be devoted to public education that explains the
requirements and pitfalls of transformation and the rationale of condi
tionality. Although the United States does not have much money to
offer, it should rely on its intellectual and political leadership to direct
a Western consensus on these issues.
Governments in Central and Eastern Europe should be expected and
nudged to make the tough economic changes that experts agree are
needed. Otherwise they will not and should not last long, and western
assistance will have been wasted.
NOTES
1. The distinction among the three models derives from my discussions with and the writings
of the distinguished Canadian economist, Sylvia Ostry. See, for example, her Governments and
Corporations in a Shrinking World: Trade and Innovation Policies in the United States, Europe,
and Japan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990) and her co-authored article in the
May 1982 issue of the OECD Observer.
2. The idea of market socialism was first put forward in the 1930s by theoreticians in the West,
such as Lange and Taylor, largely in response to the Great Depression. Next, it was revived in a
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rather special form in Yugoslavia (socialist self-management) in the early 1950s as an alternative
to the Stalinist model. Then it was resurrected in the 1960s by reform economists in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Perhaps the fullest expression of market socialism was the
blueprint of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, much of it introduced in 1968. Until the late
1980s, reform economists in all the Communist countries were politically constrained from
advocating any system change more radical than market socialism. Today, as the political
constraints have lifted in many of the former Communist countries and as negative experiences
with models of market socialism accumulate, a growing number of specialists, including the
author of this essay, have doubts that market socialism is a viable economic system. In some
cases, market socialism refers to the temporary economic system that will be in place during the
period of transition to a genuine market economy, when state-owned enterprises will still be
dominant and the government will have to play a central and pervasive role in managing the
transition.
3. For further details, see Masaru Yoshitomi, "Micro- and Macro-Foundations of Japan's
Economic Success," in Andras Koves and Paul Marer (eds.), Foreign Economic Liberalization of
Hungary and the CMEA and International Experiences (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
forthcoming). I have also benefited from discussions with Seiichi Masuyama of the Nomura
Research Institute (London) about Japan's economic system.
4. From here on, this essay relies extensively on the findings and recommendations presented
in Hungary in Transformation to Freedom and Prosperity: Economic Program Proposals of the
Joint Hungarian-International Blue Ribbon Commission (Indianapolis and Budapest: Hudson
Institute, 1990).
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Since he became Party General Secretary on March 11, 1985,
Mikhail Gorbachev has been presiding over a veritable revolution in
the Soviet Union. It is but one facet of the upheaval occurring that,
while continuing as Party General Secretary, he derives his authority
over Soviet affairs in no less degree from his status as President, a post
newly created on March 14, 1990 and to which he was elected by an
extra-party legislative body.
Gorbachev has been endeavouring to achieve a restructuring—or
perestroika as the process is now known everywhere—of Soviet soci
ety generally, but he has been especially concerned to reform the econ
omy. As one need only refer to the daily news to become aware, the
improved performance he is seeking has turned out to be decidedly
elusive. A summary review, however, may provide perspective on a
complex and ever-shifting scene. It may also provide needed back
ground for judging the possible import of further dramatic reform mea
sures currently being debated, though regrettably I cannot probe these
in any depth here.1
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I

We must have in mind some more or less familiar facts concerning
the state of the Soviet economy when Gorbachev became General Sec
retary. At that time, the Soviet economy was still organized much as it
had been under Stalin, with the means of protection predominantly
publicly owned. The collective farm, prevailing in a considerable seg
ment of agriculture, was an outstanding exception to this rule, owner
ship there being cooperative rather than public. But the distinction was
largely nominal, and enterprises of both sorts were administered
through the famous system of central planning that in essentials had
originated with Stalin.
Soviet central planning has become notorious for its cumbersome
bureaucratic character, but tempos of growth under Stalin and for a
time under his successors were quite respectable by Western standards.
Nevertheless, such tempos did not persist. Soviet national income,
which was still growing by as much as 5.1 percent yearly in the 1960s,
has slowed markedly since that time. By 1981-85, the tempo had fallen
to 1.9 percent (Table 1). Western students of the Soviet economy gen
erally consider unclassified CIA estimates as more reliable than similar
measures of growth released by the Soviet government. Soviet official
data also show a marked decline in growth, but growth rates are almost
always higher than recorded by the CIA.
While growth rates were once high, output expansion was expen
sive. Under an extensive growth process that Stalin initiated, the gov
ernment relied primarily on the sheer multiplication of inputs of labor
and capital to increase output2 This process contrasts to the intensive
one familiar in the West, where output expansion tends to be generated
in good part by technological progress and gains in efficiency more
generally. Although that requires outlays for research and develop
ment, the costs of additional output under the intensive process tend to
be distinctly less than under the extensive one.
The difference is material, for the more costly the expansion the
more limited the rewards for consumers. And under Stalin such
rewards were limited indeed, but the Dictator died on March 5, 1953.

Table 1
Selected Economic Indicators, USSR, Average Annual Rate of Growth
(percent)

1. Net material product (NMP), Soviet official8
2. Gross national product (GNP), CIA estimates1*
3. Gross fixed capital investment, Soviet official*1
4. Industrial output, Soviet official
5. Industrial output, CIA estimates"
6. Agricultural output, Soviet official6
7. Agricultural output, CIA estimates"-6
8. Real income per capita, Soviet official
9. Consumption per capita, CIA estimates"

1961-70

1971-75

6.4

5.1

5.1

3.7

6.9

6.8

8.5
6.6
c

7.4
5.9
2.5
1.4
4.3
2.9

6.5
3.8

1976-80
3.9
2.1
3.5
4.4
2.4
1.8
0.4
3.4
2.0

1981-85
3.1
1.9
3.5
3.7
2.0
1.0
(-) 0.6
2.1
1.9

1986-90
(plan)
4.1
c

4.9
4.6
c

2.7

C«5

!'o

c

2.7
c

SOURCES: Soviet official data and plan goals, TSSU (1986) and earlier volumes in the same series; Pravda, March 9, 1986; June 19, 1986; June 20,
1986; John Pitzer (1982), CIA (1985, pp. 64ff; 1989, pp. 45, 58ff); Gertrude E. Schroeder and M. Elizabeth Denton (1982). For consumption, 1981-85,
and agricultural output, 1976-85, unclassified CIA data supplied to author.
a. Utilized for consumption and accumulation.
b. Output valued in 1970 prices for growth rates for 1961-75 and in 1982 prices for growth rates for 1976-85.
c. Not available.
d. CIA estimates essentially accord with Soviet official data.
e. Yearly growth rate of average for five-year period over average for previous five-year period.
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If only out of a concern for morale and as incentives for an increas
ingly educated and sophisticated labor force, Stalin's successors have
felt impelled to moderate his onerous priorities.
While consumers have benefited as a result (Table 1), that modera
tion has meant a slowing of expansion in the volume of investment,
and that has contributed in turn to the slowdown in output growth. As a
cause of the slowdown, however, the retardation of investment volume
growth has only compounded the impact of another, widely reported
trend. The Soviet labor force, which grew by 1.4 to 1.8 percent yearly
during the 1960s and 1970s has more recently been increasing at less
than half that pace.3 Although output growth has slowed, it has
remained of the costly, extensive sort. Indeed, it may, if anything, have
become even more costly than it was before.4
The Soviet growth process nevertheless enabled a once backward
country to become, in time, a military superpower. But in 1985, when
Gorbachev became General Secretary, Soviet per capita consumption
was little more and very possibly less than 30 percent of the U.S. per
capita consumption.5
In the USSR, the immediate pre-Gorbachev years have come to be
referred to as years of stagnation (zastoi). Regarding the economy, that
must be considered as hyperbole to a degree, but Gorbachev had good
reason to be concerned upon being elevated to General Secretary. As
we may judge from his actions as well as pronouncements, he was, in
fact, deeply concerned.

II
The economic reform measures Gorbachev has initiated have been
numerous and diverse, but a principal aim has been to restructure
industrial planning. It seems clear that that is also a sphere in which his
efforts thus far have not been especially fruitful.
This is particularly evident in respect of the attempt to upgrade the
role of the industrial enterprise vis-a-vis that of central planning
authorities and in the process to substitute market-type for bureaucratic
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control over enterprise operations. Under Soviet central planning,
bureaucratic control over the enterprise has never been as complete
and control of a market type never as lacking as often supposed; but,
after a period of experimentation, the government in June and July
1987 adopted legislation supposedly providing for increased reliance
on market-type control at the expense of bureaucratic control.6
The legislation affirms that "the enterprise independently works out
and confirms its plans." The plans in question, it is explained, are to be
those for five years as well as one year. This was, on the face of it, quite
a shift from previous practice.
The grant of authority to the enterprise is qualified, however, and as
it has turned out, the qualification has been rather important. Among
other things, the enterprise is obliged to accept so-called "state orders"
(goszakazy) for its output that are submitted to it by the superior minis
try. Such orders apparently were intended to serve the ministry as a
transitional means of directing and coordinating enterprise activities.
Initially controlling a substantial share of the enterprise's output, the
state order was supposedly to give way rapidly to wholesale trade.
In fact, the state order immediately became and still is a major
instrument by which ministries control the activities of subordinate
enterprises. As Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov acknowledged in May
of this year (Pravda, May 25,1990), "for the most important products,
government orders the basic part of output—up to 95 percent."
Why was so little accomplished in this sphere? One explanation
often given in the USSR as well as the West stresses vested interests of
superior bureaucratic agencies. Concerned about their hierarchical and
material status, ministerial personnel in particular, it is said, seek
whenever possible to maintain control over the enterprise.
There is doubtless some truth in that view, but under the 1987
reforms the ministry is still responsible for the performance of enter
prises subordinate to it. At least, it is accountable for fulfillment of its
own plan. In this circumstance, even personally disinterested ministry
officials must hesitate to relax fully their grip on the enterprise.
Then, too, in order for wholesale trade to effectively supersede
bureaucratic control, it must function as a market. That is to say, enter-
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prises must be structured to respond appropriately to prices of their
inputs and outputs, and prices in turn must fluctuate appropriately in
response to the resulting enterprise supply and demand.
A principal aim of the 1987 reform measures was to subject the
enterprise to increased financial discipline, which previously had often
been wanting, and in doing so to make rewards more dependent than
before on financial results, especially profits. Insofar as such rearrange
ments materialized, the enterprise should have been oriented broadly to
respond to prices as in a market environment.
But financial discipline seemingly continues to be an elusive
desideratum for the Soviet enterprise. Indeed, there may well have
been some retrogression in this sphere, with the enterprise, perhaps as
a counterpoint to its subjection to state orders, being even less obser
vant than before of financial constraints. Particular difficulty appar
ently has been encountered in the control of wages. Unplanned growth
of the wage bill accounted, for example, for more than half of an
extraordinary increase of 9 percent last year.7 As we shall see, the
unbridled growth of wages has been costly in more ways than one.
But for an effective market, not only must enterprises be subject to
appropriate financial constraints, prices must be appropriately deter
mined. For industrial wholesale prices, that was far from the case
before 1987, and it still is. Rather than being determined by market
forces, industrial wholesale prices are, for the most part, fixed by the
government. Under the 1987 reforms, the principles observed in this
sphere were to be altered in various ways, but prices were not to be
revised accordingly until January 1,1990. The price revision has since
been further deferred, so that prices are still much as they were in June
and July 1987, when the reforms were initiated.
That is also to say that they can have had little to do with the scar
city values that an effective market generates. Rather, they have, at
best, reflected costs of earlier years—usually costs of 1982, when the
last major price revision was carried out.
The failure of the government to revise industrial wholesale prices,
if not to free them from control has been one of the most serious defi
ciencies of its efforts thus far to reform central planning, in my opin-
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ion. The more or less arbitrary prices have made a mockery of the
government's efforts to rationalize and invigorate financial controls
over the enterprise. Such controls have, in any case, proved no more
effective than they were before.
While seeking to enhance the authority of the industrial enterprise,
the government has also been in the process of restructuring the enter
prise's internal administration. It has since retreated, however, from
one particularly interesting 1987 innovation. The arrangement for
workers' election of the manager, Yugoslav-style, that was adopted in
1987 has since been abandoned.8 As Prime Minister Ryzhkov has
explained, the manager of a state enterprise is appropriately appointed
by the state whose interests, as owner, he represents.
Ill
While for Gorbachev the reform of industrial planning has been a
cardinal concern, economic restructuring has called for action much
beyond that. Indeed, reform in another related sphere, not so much
stressed initially, may well have come to be considered of comparable
urgency to that of industrial planning. The shifts in property relations
being instituted could prove more rewarding, though here too the road
to reform has not been exactly smooth. While the shifts occurring have
attracted much notice in the West, they are not always well understood.
Early on (November 19, 1986), the Gorbachev administration
declared to be permissible a wide variety of private enterprise activities
that previously had been prohibited or were at least legally dubious.
Subject to local licensing, private enterprise was legally sanctioned in
such diverse fields as handicraft manufacture, construction and repair,
and various other services. Diverse activities were still excluded, how
ever, and individuals who are normally employable in the public sector
were supposed to work on their own account only after hours. Employ
ment of hired labor was expressly forbidden.9
Even as thus restricted, this legislation represented a distinct break
with the past, but it was enacted in a milieu long conditioned to hostil-
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ity to private enterprise. The restrictions maintained on private enter
prise activity must be seen in that light, and so too must be the
government's decision to levy onerously progressive taxes on any ele
vated private enterprise incomes.10
Not too surprisingly, enactment of the new legislation on private
enterprise has not been followed by any wholesale shift to such activ
ity. Nearly four years later there were still only 500,000 persons regis
tered for employment in private enterprise (Pravda, July 7,1990).
A near counterpart of such private enterprise, however, has fared
decidedly better. While nominally a producers' cooperative (co-op) the
collective farm, as I noted, is practically a state enterprise. That is also
true of the consumers' co-op that continued through the years to func
tion in trade, primarily in rural localities.
After much public discussion, however, the Gorbachev administra
tion has declared the cooperative to be a basic form, along with state
enterprise, of socialist economic organization, and has acted to codify
its widespread use as a substantially autonomous entity in industry,
trade, and services. Here too some activities have been expressly
excluded, and members must participate actively in the cooperative's
work; employment of hired labor is allowed, however.11
While ideologically on a somewhat different plane from individual
private enterprise, the cooperative has by no means enjoyed an easy
acceptance. But in the critical sphere of taxation, its members, after
much controversy and vacillation, have come to be treated on a par
with workers in state enterprise. 12 The upshot has been a rapid increase
in employment in co-ops, the number of persons engaged having
reached by now five million (Izvestiia, July 29, 1990) or some 3 per
cent of the labor force.
The activities of co-ops are diverse. Particularly noteworthy is the
fact that they are beginning to take advantage of further novel legisla
tion allowing them, along with other interested parties, to acquire con
trol over productive assets by leasehold contract. In the process, they
have even taken over, under contract, shops or departments of state
enterprises. Under the lease agreement, they usually produce for sale to
the lessor enterprise.13 While such arrangements are so far of very
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modest dimensions quantitatively, they have been seen in the USSR as
a possible basis for extensive privatization of state enterprise (FBIS,
Dec. 20,1989, p. 47).
Leasing has been envisaged in that way regarding not only industry,
but agriculture. Indeed, some Soviet economists have seen the lease
arrangement as a way to supplant collective and state farm agriculture
with not only genuine co-ops but individual family farms. Here too,
though, such restructuring has, to date, materialized only on a minute
scale (Report on the USSR, July 14, 1989; Brooks, 1990a; 1990b;
Pravda, July 29,1990).
Promotion of private enterprise is also the apparent objective of a
still more novel measure just enacted. As well as being very new, the
law on joint stock companies is very complex. But, through an appro
priate distribution of shares, it evidently could be, like the lease, an
instrument for privatization of state enterprise, and its use in that way
has been urged by no less a person than Nikolai Petrakov, an advisor to
Gorbachev. Having enacted legislation of this sort, the government, not
surprisingly, seems to have finally abandoned its prohibition of
employment of hired labor by private enterprise.14
I alluded to the prevalence in the USSR of a hostility to private
enterprise. Once deeply rooted ideologically, such hostility is now in
the process of erosion. At least it no longer shapes public policy as it
once did. By no means, however, has it been rendered nugatory. Its
influence can still be seen in residual legislative disabilities and restric
tions to which I have referred, and even more in the administration of
relevant statutes. Often left to republican and local governments, such
administration has tended to compound obstacles to newer enterprise
forms.15
Private enterprise, moreover, continues to be affected by a related
factor that is at the same time unfavorable as well as favorable. Soviet
planning is in the process of being reformed, but it is as yet not radi
cally different from what it was previously. That is to say, it is still a
system where prices are notably distorted and shortages notably fre
quent.16
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In this environment private enterprise, predictably, has often had to
cope with daunting difficulties, especially in materials procurement,
and has often experienced very favorable opportunities, such as pro
vided by high prices for products in short supply. In these circum
stances, private enterprise, also predictably, has often engaged in
bribery and other illicit activities, and frequently earns large rewards
which, even when derived from legitimate activities, are easily seen as
inordinate. The Soviet leadership is apparently committed to the exten
sion of private enterprise, but that can be expected to continue to be, as
it has been, a troubled process.
IV
We have considered the number of major economic reforms initi
ated since Gorbachev became Party General Secretary in March 1985.
In seeking to grasp the import of perestroika for the economy, we must
now turn to a further development—though it is properly viewed as a
retrogression rather than as a reform.
Under central planning, while the government relied generally on
bureaucratic procedures to coordinate and direct economic activities, it
also made limited use of market-like arrangements for that purpose.
Among other things, it traditionally distributed consumer goods to
households through a retail market. There households were able to pur
chase consumer goods with money they received in wages in return for
services rendered or in other ways. For the most part, goods were made
available to households at fixed prices in state retail shops, but house
holds could also obtain foodstuffs in free markets where collective
farms and their members disposed of surplus supplies.
Households could acquire consumer goods in these ways, insofar as
such products were available. In fact, they were by no means always
available, for with state shops the preponderant outlet and supplies and
prices for the most part determined through a bureaucratic process, the
retail market did not work very well. Lately, it has hardly worked at all.
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Never entirely absent from the Soviet scene, queues and empty shop
shelves have now become pervasive. Some scarce products are
rationed locally or distributed preferentially to their workers by
employing establishments. For the rest, the ruble has been aptly held to
be not real money, but a kind of lottery ticket, generally redeemable for
goods only with luck and perseverance.
The breakdown of the Soviet consumer goods market has been
widely reported. As rarely understood, however, there has been no
sharp fall-off in consumer goods supplies. Provision of some food
stuffs is down, and supplies of other products—cigarettes are the latest
example—have fallen off irregularly. Per capita consumption overall,
however, according to the CIA (CIA, DIA 1990) is little, if at all,
below pre-Gorbachev levels.
Supplies, nevertheless, are in fact markedly short of demand. That is
due chiefly to a mushrooming government budget deficit, which last
year reached 92 billion rubles or 10 percent of the Gross National
Product. The government has been funding the deficit in good part by
inordinate currency emissions. 17 Lax wage and credit controls, to
which I have already referred, have compounded the inflationary
development.
The government, however, has chosen to hold down most consumer
goods prices, so that the inflation has been primarily repressed rather
than overt. Thus, the major imbalance of demand and supply that has
materialized has resulted not so much in price increases as in involun
tary household savings in the form of cash and savings deposits. The
savings have been involuntary in the sense that goods have not been
available on which to spend them.
The breakdown of the consumer goods market has, needless to say,
been onerous for consumers, but it has also been costly otherwise. By
eroding labor incentives, as widely reported, it has begun to cause what
in the USSR is euphemistically called a "falling off of interest in
work."
I referred earlier to the difficulties posed for reform by the continued
prevalence of economically irrational wholesale prices. It has not
helped that at the artificially low levels at which the government has
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held them, retail prices too have been notably divorced from scarcity
values. For food products the prevailing low retail levels could be
maintained only through provision of subsidies which in the aggregate
were nearly as large as the entire government budget deficit (FBIS,
Sept. 28,1989).
Why has the Gorbachev administration allowed such a doleful con
juncture to materialize? Soviet commentary is not as incisive on that
very relevant question as one might wish, but long accustomed to a
consumer goods market that was not exactly flawless, the leadership,
one surmises, was not as alert and sensitive initially as it might have
been to the deleterious effects of the budgetary indiscipline in which
they indulged. If only tardily, they have now come to grasp clearly
enough the unfavorable results of such a financial policy, and have
been seeking in diverse ways to repair the damage. 18 But, as we know
from our own experience, balancing a budget, once it is greatly out of
balance, is a neat trick, not easily accomplished.

Gorbachev had reason enough to try to reform the Soviet economy.
How has the economy performed since then? In view of the breakdown
of the consumer goods market, the question in a sense answers itself,
but it is still of interest to observe that, as estimated by the CIA, growth
of output overall actually accelerated in 1986 (Table 2). That was due
chiefly, however, to a bumper farm crop. Since 1986, growth has
tended to be even slower than in 1981-85. The agricultural harvest this
year has reportedly been exceptional again, but industrial output is now
declining absolutely, and the fall could be marked. 19 The ambitious tar
gets of the 13th five-year plan (1986-90), set early on by the Gor
bachev administration (Table 1), are evidently far beyond reach.
If Gorbachev has not yet succeeded in reinvigorating the Soviet
economy as he set out to do, that is not very surprising. The political
revolution that he has also been actively promoting has rightly been
acclaimed in the West and clearly enjoys wide support in the USSR
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itself, but the resultant disintegration of totalitarianism has often
brought with it notable indiscipline and disorder, which are hardly
favorable to economic performance. The recent, much-noted Soviet
Republic assertions of sovereignty are only one, albeit important, man
ifestation of this new Soviet politics.
Table 2
Growth of National Income, USSR
Annual Average, 1981-85 and 1986-89, and Annually, 1986-89
(percent)
Gross National Product
Net Material Product
(GNP), CIA
(NMP), Soviet official"
1.9
3.1
1981-85
2.2b
2.2
1986-89
4.1
1.6
1986
1.3
0.7
1987
2.2
4.6
1988
c
1.4
1989
SOURCES: Table 1; TSSU (1989, p. 16); CIA-DIA(1990).
a. "Utilized for consumption and accumulation."
b. 1986-88.
c. Not available.

In pondering the experience to date under Gorbachev, one must con
sider too that his five years in office is after all a very brief interval in
which to transform an economic system that was some seven decades
in the making. A surge in growth would have been nice, but as Soviet
economists themselves have properly cautioned, was hardly to be
expected.20
Granting the extenuating circumstances, however, questions may be
raised about the nature and implementation of the reform program that
the government has initiated. One must wonder particularly whether
the egregious inconsistencies in the measures to restructure industrial
planning could not have been foreseen and avoided. Among Western
students of the Soviet economy, a questions is also often raised about
the underlying strategy, especially the priority accorded the relatively
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intractable task of reforming industrial planning over that of privatiza
tion of agriculture and services.
I have been referring to Soviet economic performance under Gor
bachev as it is manifest in overall growth. Unsatisfactory as the record
has been from that standpoint, it has been much less satisfactory in
respect of the rudimentary task of distributing among households
available supplies of consumer goods. Costly for the consumers, the
retail market breakdown is probably also beginning to have an adverse
impact on production and growth. And here too it is permissible to ask
whether, with more skillful management at the highest level, a more
favorable outcome might not have been achievable.21
But, disappointing though economic reform has been, it need not be
irrevocably so. Do not some of the reform measures, especially those
in the sphere of ownership, have potentialities yet to be effectively
exploited? If, on the other hand, there has often been less than profi
cient management, is that not remediable? What, in any event, are the
prospects that economic reform will become a more rewarding
endeavor in due course?
The answers must depend in good part on the outcome of discus
sions now in progress, to which I alluded at the outset. The dismal
results of reform thus far have, not surprisingly, provoked wide-rang
ing debate over its future course. The outcome of such discussion is
still not too clear, but one perhaps need not wait for t 's to be crossed
and fs to be dotted on resultant measures to anticipate that restructur
ing favorable to private enterprise and the market already in progress
will continue, very possibly at an accelerated pace. The imbalance in
the consumer goods market could be ameliorated in the process, but
that seems especially conjectural.22
Unfortunately, all signs also point to a continuation of the indisci
pline and disorder lately experienced. Such behavior could easily
become more prevalent under the impact of ongoing political shifts,
especially the still unlegitimated transfer of power under way from the
center to the republics. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
economic reinvigoration that Gorbachev has been seeking will likely
continue to be elusive for some time to come. The USSR, it has been
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said, is now at the edge of the abyss. That is doubtless hyperbole, but
the short-term outlook for the Soviet economy is hardly bright.
NOTES
1. With the kind permission of Dr. Armand Clesse, I sometimes draw on a paper, "Economics
of Perestroika" which I presented at a conference in Luxembourg in 1988, and which was
subsequently published in Armand Clesse and Thomas C. Schelling, eds., The Western
Community and the Gorbachev Challenge. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1989.1 allude in the text to an
ongoing debate on the future course of economic reform, and in conclusion allow myself to
speculate on the outcome of this controversy. These very general remarks still seemed sufficiently
apt not to require revision when news came (on the day of the lecture!) of Gorbachev's
recommendations to the Supreme Soviet on the matter at issue.
2. See the measures of "factor productivity" in Bergson (1989a; ch. 6); CIA (1988, p. 63).
3. The decline in labor force growth is due to reduced increases in labor participation rates as
well as demographic factors. See Fesbach (1983); Rapawy and Baldwin (1982, Part 2), and CIA
(1987, p. 70).
4. See Bergson (1989) and CIA (1988).
5. Essentially an extrapolation from Schroeder and Denton (1982) and Bergson (1989a, ch. 4),
using data in CIA (1987, pp. 53,66); Economic Report of the President (1988, p. 279).
6. For the relevant decrees and related legislation, see O korennoi... (1987). For an
illuminating discussion of this legislation and its antecedents, see Hewett, Winston et al. (1987);
Schroeder (1987); Hewett (1988); Joint Economic Committee (1987); Desai (1989). Note that the
key measure on the state enterprise, enacted on June 30,1987, was not to become effective until
Jan. 1,1988.
7. Pravda, Jan. 28,1990. The government instituted in the fourth quarter of 1990 an onerous
tax on inordinate increases in wages in industries other than those producing consumer goods
(Pravda, Aug. 11, 1990), but the intended discouragement of such boosts hardly materialized.
That has been, it seems essentially because of the elliptic interpretation of the scope of exempt
industries.
8. See FBIS, Dec. 14,1989, pp. 42-43; Izvestiia, June 12,1990. The 1987 legislation also gave
to the workers' collective the option to have their incomes determined, in the Yugoslav manner, as
a residual share after nonlabor expenses and taxes. This arrangement too, I believe, is no longer
allowed.
9. For the Nov. 19,1986 decree, see Pravda, Nov. 21,1986. On the decree and its application
in practice, see also Blough, Muratore, and Berk (1987, vol. 2); Roucek (1988); Pomorski (1988).
10. In its latest formulation (Pravda, May 6,1990), the tax on, say, a full-time handicraftsman
is not as progressive as it was formerly, but the marginal rate still rises quickly from 20 percent on
incremental income at the 3,001 ruble annual income level to 60 percent on such income in excess
of 6,000 rubles. For wage earners and salaried workers, too, the marginal tax rate rises to 60
percent, but not until the annual income reaches 36,000 rubles. Even so, the tax on such workers
has become more progressive than it was formerly.
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11. For the key statutes, see Pravda, June 8, 1988; FBIS, October 23, 1989, Nov. 16, 1989,
July 12,1990. On excluded activities, see also FBIS, Jan. 5, 1989; Report on the USSR, Feb. 3,
1989.
12. See Pravda, May 6,1990. All-union legislation on the taxation of cooperatives as such, as
distinct from their members, also seems not to discriminate against such organizations, but
republican authorities are apparently allowed a degree of discretion to do so, if they should so
wish (Izvestiia, June 29,1990).
13. Leasing of productive assets is not new in the USSR, but the government seems to have
modified regulations for its wide use only recently, initially in a law of April 7, 1989, and then
apparently in a revised version in a law of Nov. 23, 1989 (Pravda, April 9, 1989, December 1,
1989).
14. The basic law (Ekonomika i zhizn'. No. 27, July 1990) should be read together with
additional measures on ownership (Pravda, March 10,1990) and on small business (FBIS, Aug.
10, 1990, p. 43). See also Report on the USSR, May 11, 1990. Petrakov apparently envisages a
distribution of shares primarily among state institutions, such as banks and local governments, but
they would also be made available to private individuals (Moscow News, No. 26,1990).
15. On the restrictive republican and local policies and practices, and on the disabilities of
private enterprise more generally, see Plokker (1990). Also illuminating regarding the status of
the co-ops in particular is FBIS, July 13,1989, pp. 71-74.
16. In the consumer goods market, of particular importance to private enterprise, the price
distortions and shortages have, if anything, become more pronounced under Gorbachev. See
below, Section IV.
17. Ofer (1990) and the related comment of Bergson.
18. Most notably in the program presented by Ryzhkov to the Supreme Soviet in May but not
approved by that body. An outstanding feature was the proposal to sharply increase prices of
consumer goods, including grossly subsidized food products. See FBIS (May 25,1990).
19. The state statistical office reports (Pravda, July 29, 1990) that Net Material Product
declined by 2.0 percent during the first six months of 1990 compared with the corresponding
period in 1989. Reference is to "national income produced" rather than "national income
utilized," but the statistical office has now begun to report also on the GNP, apparently as that is
understood in the West. For the first half of 1990, that shows a decline of 1 percent. These figures
for the first half, which are probably inflated, would not register the exceptional harvest, but by
the same token should indicate a decline in nonfarm output. There are many indications that that
decline is accelerating.
20. Soviet economists seemed to be optimistic initially, though, in supposing that the
transformation could be completed in a relatively brief period (FBIS, Feb. 12,1988, pp. 66ff, May
11.1988, pp. 81ff, May 23,1988, pp. 81ff).
21. It may not be amiss to note that for the writer this is not just hindsight. I stressed the fiscal
incongruities at a symposium in Moscow in December 1987. What I said, though, was apparently
no surprise to at least one Soviet participant, Leonid Abalkin.
22. On the principal alternative programs being considered, see FBIS (May 25, 1990);
Ryzhkov (Pravda, Sept. 12,1990); Shatalin et al. (Izvestiia, Sept. 4,1990).
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Reconstructing the
Soviet Planned Economy
Joseph S. Berliner
Russian Research Center
Paper presented
February 20,1991
Six years ago the Soviet Politburo chose Mikhail Sergeyevich Gor
bachev to lead the Communist party and the country. He must have
been regarded by his colleagues as a firm and decisive political leader
committed to the system he was selected to lead. He must also have
been congenial to the wing of the party leadership that felt a profound
dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy and was open to
new ideas, even radical ideas, for changes that might improve its per
formance. There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that Gor
bachev himself had any particular conception of what those changes
ought to be.
The one idea he had been associated with for a long time was the socalled "brigade method" of production organization. The idea was to
organize the workforce in each farm and factory in such a way that
each group of workers, called a brigade, would be responsible for a
clearly defined production task from beginning to end. For example,
instead of paying some workers for plowing a field, others for planting
it and others for harvesting it, one brigade would have the responsibil
ity for all three tasks. The brigade would then be paid on the basis of
the final quantity harvested. The workers would therefore have a mate
rial interest in seeing to it that the plowing and all the other operations
were done well; this is in contrast to the traditional method in which
tractor drivers were paid for plowing a piece of land and could not be
held accountable if poor plowing were responsible for a poor harvest.
Gorbachev was a great promoter of the brigade method, both as party
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leader of his province of Stavropol, and later as a Politburo official in
charge of agriculture.
The language of economic management at the time distinguished
two methods of organizing economic activity. One was the "adminis
trative method," in which people were told what job to perform and
how to perform it by a manager or planning official. The other was the
"economic method," which was designed to provide direct material
incentives in a way that would motivate workers to do what the plan
ners wanted them to do without having to be monitored at each stage.
To be a radical in those days was to be a supporter of economic meth
ods, stressing individual incentives over planning directives. The bri
gade method is an example of an economic method, and Gorbachev, as
a promoter of economic methods, must have represented the enlight
ened radical wing of the party leadership.
This background is useful as a benchmark from which to judge the
distance that the Soviet economic debate has progressed in those six
years. Only in a few abstruse economic journals did the term "market"
appear from time to time, and the term "privatization" was not to be
found at all. Neither of those concepts could have been in the minds of
the Politburo when the vote on the new General Secretary was taken.
The man they elected must have distinguished himself not by a vision
of a radically different Soviet economic system, but by his bold expres
sion of dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy and by his
advocacy of economic rather than administrative methods, which was
the mark of a farseeing party leader of that time.
The reasons for the leadership's dissatisfaction with the perfor
mance of the economy are well known and need little elaboration. The
primary reason was the relative decline of the USSR in the economicgrowth competition since the Second World War. In the late 1950s, the
Soviet growth rate was more than twice that of the United States, and it
exceeded all the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop
ment countries except West Germany and Japan. Those were the years
in which the Soviet leadership confidently believed that it was only a
matter of time before their country would surpass the United States and
outdistance the entire capitalist world. In the subsequent decades, the
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growth rate declined in many countries, but the decline was more rapid
in the USSR. Consequently, by the end of the 1970s the Soviet growth
rate was exceeded by the United States and by more than half of the
OECD countries.1 Moreover, the capitalist countries of the Pacific Rim
were growing at such phenomenal rates that their per capita incomes
were likely soon to overtake those of the USSR. The Soviet leadership
no longer contemplated the gratifying prospect of surpassing the capi
talist world, but instead now faced the dismal possibility of losing the
economic capability of maintaining all the foreign and domestic com
mitments undertaken in support of their superpower status in the past.
The leadership also shared a certain view about why the growth per
formance of the economy had deteriorated so badly. Soviet economists
had developed a mode of analysis of the sources of growth similar to
the analysis of factor productivity that was developed in the West in the
1960s.2 The Soviet analysis distinguished between "extensive" and
"intensive" growth. The principal source of extensive growth is a
growing stock of capital (as well as labor and land), while the principal
source of intensive growth is the improved quality of the capital stock
deriving from technological progress. The comparative analysis of
economic growth in these terms showed that while the growth of the
capitalist countries was primarily of the intensive kind, deriving from
technological progress, Soviet growth was primarily of the extensive
kind, deriving from heavy investment in increasing the capital stock.
The meaning of this result was that the USSR had missed the boat of
modern technological progress, and that was the major cause of declin
ing growth performance relative to other countries. This line of analy
sis was eventually accepted by the top leadership of the country, and
the acceleration of technological progress had become a major theme
in high-level government reports.
These were the economic concerns of the Communist party leader
ship in 1985. They elected a General Secretary who looked as if he
could shake the economy up in ways that would restore the high
growth rates of the past and would accelerate technological progress to
a rate appropriate for a great power.
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Soviet Economic Performance

The poor performance of the Soviet economy has been widely
reported and is well known in the West This, however, is only one side
of the story. If this side of the story says that things were pretty bad,
there is another side of the story that says things weren't all that bad.
This second side has not been widely reported in the press, perhaps for
the same reason that lawful behavior is not widely reported but crimi
nal behavior is. In both cases the preoccupation with pathology can
give a distorted impression of the state of the society. In the Soviet
case, the persistent reporting of the bad news, unrelieved by any good
news, led to such hyperbolic expressions as "crisis" and "basket case."
In the early 1980s, for example, there were reports that the new Reagan
administration believed the Soviet economy to be so close to collapse
that the need to respond to the Strategic Defense Initiative would be
enough to push it over the edge.
That view lacked a sense of perspective. Things can be tough with
out being ready to fall apart. In fact the Soviet economy in 1985 was
still reasonably productive and stable, despite its poor record relative to
the leading economies of the world. One need only look at the USSR
today to recall how stable and productive it was six years ago. Two
pieces of evidence may be cited.
Professor Abram Bergson calculated Soviet labor productivity to be
58 percent of that of the United States in 1975. This compares with the
United Kingdom at 75 percent, Spain at 68 percent, and Japan at 64
percent of the United States. Some portion of the Soviet lag is due to
the fact that the capital per worker is smaller in the USSR than in the
other countries. Drawing on the experience of a group of capitalist
countries, Bergson estimated Soviet labor productivity at about 73 per
cent of that to be expected in a capitalist country that had the same cap
ital per worker as the USSR.3 The finding is consistent with the
common view that the Soviet economy's performance is significantly
inferior to that of the capitalist economies, but on the other hand it does
not depict an economy that is headed for disaster.4
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With respect to technological attainment, the most authoritative
study is that of a research group of engineers and economists at the
University of Birmingham, in England. Their study covered a range of
industrial products such as chemical engineering, steelmaking, and
computers. They found that in most fields of technology the USSR
lagged behind the West, with the largest lags in the most rapidly
advancing technologies like microelectronics. However, there was no
evidence that the gap widened during the period 1956-1976.5 During
those years technology was advancing very rapidly in the West, and
since the Soviets managed to keep the gap from widening, their rate of
technological progress must have been substantial. That is not a satis
factory performance from the perspective of the Soviet leadership, for
at those relative rates of technological advance the USSR would
remain forever behind. There is also some evidence that the gap did
widen somewhat after 1976, particularly in the crucial field of micro
electronics. Yet the picture is one of a country with substantial techno
logical capability, though not in the major league of world
technological advance.
The significance of this second side of the story is that the Soviet
leadership did not launch this massive economic transformation out of
dire necessity. It was not an economy in shambles, and they were not
under siege by hungry masses demanding change. It was not like
China after Mao, where actual starvation occurred in parts of the coun
try and the desperate peasants themselves dissolved the communes and
divided the land into family farms. It was not like Poland in 1989 with
inflation running at 1000 percent a year and the shops bare of many
foodstuffs. Unlike those countries, the decision to undertake a radical
change in the economic system was motivated by the conviction of the
leadership that the continuation of business as usual would cause the
USSR to fall continuously behind the rest of the world. By the end of
the century, it was increasingly said, the Soviet Union would have
become a Third World country.
Gorbachev's policy is therefore properly viewed as a "revolution
from above," in the tradition of Peter the Great three hundred years
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earlier. That perspective—that it is a revolution from above—explains
a great deal about the way in which the transition has evolved
First, it explains the extensive resistance, both active and passive, to
the program of economic restructuring. The old system still delivered
on some of its original promises, such as the elimination of capitalisttype unemployment. Virtually no factory had been closed down in the
USSR since its inception, and no Soviet worker knew what it was like
to "lose a job." Earnings were low, but bread and meat prices and
apartment rents were also extremely low, so that everybody could
afford them. Quality and availability were poor, but no one starved or
went homeless. It was not a hungry population clamoring for a new
system that, for all its promises, would bring unemployment and an
end to the low prices on bread and housing. Gorbachev did succeed in
marshaling the support of like-minded political and military leaders,
and he kindled the enthusiasm of liberal intellectuals; but there was no
large constituency demanding change, and there were large social
groups, such as workers and bureaucrats, who felt threatened by radi
cal change.
Second, it explains why the new government, committed to radical
economic change, had only the vaguest idea of what kinds of changes
it wanted to bring about Past governments had encouraged research on
ways of improving the operation of the economic system, but never
having doubted the fundamental soundness of that system, they had
not authorized research on alternative systems. If there was a desert in
the USSR, it was not in the economy or in the technology, but in the
stock of economic ideas. The most radical ideas that had appeared in
print were recommendations for making greater use of such economic
methods as price and profit incentives, instead of administrative meth
ods. No doubt many economists secretly harbored more radical ideas
than that, but they were not part of the open economic discourse.
Third, and perhaps most important, it explains the other major com
ponent of the transformation—democratization; particularly it explains
glasnost, or freedom of expression. Gorbachev has sometimes been
criticized for having weakened central political controls before eco
nomic decentralization had been accomplished. The example of post-
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Mao China, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, is thought to demon
strate that the combination of tight central political control with exten
sive individual economic freedom is the best formula for rapid
economic transformation.
Gorbachev believed, however, that that formula would not work in
the USSR. For generations the party had preached the superiority of
the Soviet socialist planned economy, the wisdom of the party's leader
ship, the correctness and necessity of Stalin's heritage, and the freedom
of Soviet citizens from the evils of unemployment and exploitation that
plagued the capitalist world. With that history, it was impossible to
announce one day that the system was now to be totally dismantled and
replaced by one suspiciously similar to capitalism in many ways. The
people had to be convinced that they had been lied to all these years—
that Stalin had been a tyrant, that the system he introduced had
destroyed rather than released the creative energies of the masses, that
the Soviet people had fallen in lethargy and moral decay, and that the
capitalists do a lot of things right and it was necessary to learn how to
do them, even if the learning will be painful.
This is why glasnost was thought to be necessary. If Gorbachev had
sought to undertake a radical change without loosening the political
and ideological reins, he would have had to rely on the existing instru
ments of power, the party and the economic bureaucracy. These organi
zations had proven to be largely reform-resistant in the past, even to
the modest within-system reforms introduced by past General Secre
taries. In no way could they be counted on to execute the directives of
a new General Secretary whose slogan was not simply the improve
ment of the traditional economic system, but the complete reconstruc
tion—perestroika—of that system into a new system that would have
little use for planners and ministries.
I think Gorbachev was right. In the USSR at least, there could be no
economic transformation without weakening the power of the party
and the ministerial bureaucracy, without liberalization of personal
expression, and without coming to terms with the past
Glasnost has been politically costly. It has released powerful forces
of nationalism, separatism, xenophobia, and reaction. Nevertheless,

60 Reconstructing the Soviet Planned Economy

without that political liberalization it would not have been possible to
have gotten to the point today where a popularly elected Soviet Parlia
ment is debating not whether to introduce private property and mar
kets, but the speed and extent of privatization and marketization.
The proposals now before Parliament are so radical that the restruc
turing efforts of the past six years look like ancient history. They were
of crucial importance, however, in bringing the economy, and the
debate about the economy, to the point it has reached today. I would
like to discuss two developments that are fundamental in the restruc
turing of the economy: first, changes in the rules of property owner
ship; and second, changes in what the Soviets call "the economic
mechanism" referring to planning or markets. I will then conclude with
a brief discussion of two other developments that have greatly compli
cated the transition to a restructured economy and may possibly bring
the process to a halt. They are the onset of inflation, and the political
conflict between the national and the republic governments.
Legalization of Private Property

The first significant break with the past under Gorbachev was the
legalization of certain limited forms of private ownership of productive
property. The most widespread form is the cooperative, in which two
or more persons form an enterprise that operates much like our partner
ship. Individual persons and their families are also permitted to engage
in economic activity, but the cooperative has become the dominant
form of the new private enterprise.6
Cooperatives are permitted to buy and own productive equipment,
to hire wage labor, to produce and sell goods and services, and to deter
mine their own prices rather than sell at the low state-controlled prices.
The cooperators may retain the profit as their private income after pay
ing taxes. They are typically engaged in such activities as the produc
tion of clothing, restaurant services, small-scale construction, taxis,
and repair services for automobiles, plumbing, consumer durables, and
so forth.
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Cooperatives have encountered intense hostility from many sections
of the public. Part of the reason is a general antipathy toward the eco
nomic activities conducted by persons who are thought of as middle
men, speculators, merchants, exploiters, and capitalists—sentiments
long cultivated by Soviet propaganda but having deeper roots in tradi
tional Russian culture. But there are more specific reasons.
The prices charged to the public are substantially higher in the coop
eratives than in state stores. One reason is that their costs are higher.
Cooperatives have to pay higher prices for their own supplies because
they provide higher-quality goods and services. They also pay higher
prices for many of the supplies they need than state enterprises have to
pay.
In addition to higher costs, cooperative prices are higher because
they often sell in markets where state-supplied products are sold at
controlled prices far below market-clearing price levels. Cooperative
prices, which have to cover costs, must therefore be sold at prices that
are well above those in state stores. To the Soviet public, however, the
cooperators are simply price gougers, and the growing shortages of
goods in the state shops are thought to be due to the cooperatives that
buy the goods cheap and sell them dear in their own shops. The income
of cooperators are also much higher than the average, and they are not
shy about flaunting their new wealth in conspicuously high living.
In addition to a hostile public, the cooperatives also face hostile
local government officials who see in them a threat to what was for
merly their monopoly of power. These officials have waged an effec
tive rear-guard battle against the cooperatives, by denying them
licenses, raising their tax rates, and impeding their access to supplies
and to building space in which to conduct their business. Inevitably,
relationships of this sort spawn corruption, including payoffs to politi
cal and police officials and protection money to ordinary hoodlums, all
of which further increases the cost of doing business and therefore the
prices that cooperatives charge.
After this litany of obstacles, one might guess that very few cooper
atives have succeeded. On the contrary, despite these handicaps, the
cooperative movement has grown dramatically. The number of people
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employed in cooperatives grew from a few thousand initially to about
4.5 million people last April. They are now reported to be producing
almost 5 percent of the gross domestic product There is no doubt that
the consumption levels of many Soviet citizens is significantly higher
because of the co-ops, although higher-income citizens have benefited
more than the less well-off. The movement also gives reason to believe
that there are substantial untapped entrepreneurial talents in the Soviet
population, contrary to the opinion of some Soviet observers that 70
years of socialism has destroyed that talent.
More significant than the growth in the number of cooperatives is
the accumulation of experience. Millions of Soviet citizens have
learned how to figure out what other people want to buy, how to
acquire materials, equipment and labor, and how to figure costs. They
have learned how to borrow from the State Bank, and some coopera
tives have banded together to form their own cooperative banks. Some
have learned how to attract and work with foreigners in joint ventures;
it was a cooperative that almost pulled off the notorious export of mili
tary tanks that created something of a sensation last year.7 The quiet
and steady accumulation of business experience by the cooperatives
may in the long run prove to be the major development during these six
years in preparing the country for the move to a market economy.
Until last year, the legalization of cooperative and individual enter
prise was the major change in the property ownership rules of the
economy. There was little echo in the USSR of the tempestuous move
ment in Eastern Europe to proceed with the privatization of the huge
sector of state-owned enterprises. That has now changed. The so-called
"500-day plan" proposed to change the ownership forms of almost all
of the state-owned enterprises. Smaller workshops and retail stores
were to be auctioned off, to be run as private enterprises. Larger state
enterprises were to be converted to joint stock companies, the shares to
be transferred eventually to citizens. State ownership would continue
only in defense industry and in natural monopolies such as railways
and electric grids.8
The 500-day plan was adopted by the Russian republic, but only a
considerably watered-down form of it was adopted by the USSR
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Supreme Soviet. Privatization is becoming a major issue dividing the
liberals from the conservatives. In light of the conservative swing in
Soviet politics at present, clearly supported by Gorbachev, privatiza
tion does not have a bright future at this time. Barring a radical shift in
political power, the legalization of private enterprise rather than priva
tization of state enterprise is likely to be the extent of the restructuring
of ownership rules in the Soviet economy for some time to come.
The 1987 State Enterprise Law
The second fundamental feature of an economic system is the mech
anism employed for coordinating the transactions of the millions of
enterprises and economic agents. Modern history knows only two
mechanisms of this kind—markets and planning. Before the Russian
Revolution, markets were the predominant mechanism in modern
economies. Economic planning was the great Soviet contribution to the
repertory of economic institutions.
For 70 years, Soviet ideology had preached the evils of capitalist
markets and the superiority of socialist planning. Again, it took the pol
icy of glasnost to launch the debate in which many people learned for
the first time how badly the planning mechanism had in fact operated,
and how and why markets do many things better than planning. The
growing pressure for marketization finally bore some fruit in the cru
cial State Enterprise Law of 1987.
The law declared that state-owned enterprises should thereafter
decide for themselves what to produce, rather than be directed by the
planners on what to produce. They should also negotiate with other
enterprises for their supplies, rather than have their supplies allocated
to them by the planners. They should compete with each other for
sales, and in making their production and supply decisions they should
seek to maximize their profit. If fully implemented, those provisions of
the law would have the effect of substantially replacing the central
planning mechanism by a market mechanism.
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That was July 1987. Marketization has proceeded to some degree,
but Soviet economists are uniformly agreed that it has not proceeded
very far. The reasons may be seen in two of the many problems
encountered in the implementation of the law.
First, to protect the economy against the possibility that the new and
untried market system might fail—not an unreasonable precaution—
the planners were given the right to issue to enterprises plan directives
of the old kind—now called "state orders"—if in their judgment the
new and untried system might not produce the required quantities of all
commodities.
In fact, many enterprises felt unready to take the plunge. On the pro
duction side, they were used to producing what they were told by a
ministry to produce, with the ministry then arranging for the sale of
their products. Now they were told to figure out for themselves what
and how much to produce. What if they produced too much and could
not sell it? They were used to the ministry informing them how much
fuel, iron and other supplies they were to receive, and who their suppli
ers would be. Now they were told that they must find their own suppli
ers, in an economy where everything was in short supply. What if they
could not find suppliers willing and able to sell them as much as they
needed?
To protect themselves from such pitfalls, many enterprises pleaded
with their ministries to issue them state orders for as much of their pro
duction as possible. Producing in response to a state order guaranteed
that the ministry would accept responsibility for the sale of the product
and also arrange for the required supplies to be made available. The
ministries, in turn, were happy to issue state orders liberally because
the new law placed them in an administratively impossible situation:
they continued to be responsible for the performance of their enter
prises, but they were deprived of the power to tell their enterprises
what to do.
The result was that in the first year in which the new law was in
operation, state orders—which are equivalent to the old central plan
ning—accounted for a huge proportion of industrial output, ranging
from 90 percent to 100 percent in some industries.9 Despite the criti-
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cism of reformers, most output continues to be produced under central
planning rather than market conditions. Former Prime Minister Ryzhkov expressed the hope that production under state orders could be
reduced to 40 percent by 1991,10 but there seems little likelihood that
so sharp a decline in central control will be brought about so rapidly.
The story reflects the anxieties and the conflicting forces associated
with the transition from planning to markets. But such anxiety ought to
be expected in the circumstances. It is indeed something of an achieve
ment that many enterprises are now operating without state orders for
some or all of their output and are evidently learning how to market
their products and how to contract for the delivery of their material
supplies. Auctions, bazaars, fairs and barter trade are some of the spon
taneous developments of new institutions that may prove to be the
forerunners of genuine markets. 11 This part of the story of the 1987 law
is one of an initial setback, but also of the beginnings of a gradual
accommodation to the needs of a market system.
The second problem of the 1987 law derives from the fact that dur
ing the transition the economy is neither fully marketized nor fully
planned, but is some combination of the two. Under such circum
stances, some highly undesirable phenomena can occur.
For example, in response to the law's instruction to enterprises to
maximize profit, managers set about seeking the most profitable items
to produce, and dropping the production of items that yielded losses or
very little profit. As a result, some products began to disappear from
the shops, with unfortunate consequences. The saddest case occurred
when hospitals suddenly discovered that they were unable to obtain
disposable hypodermic needles. It turned out that the director of the
only enterprise producing syringes, wishing to be a good citizen under
perestroika, found that they were not profitable and switched to the
production of more profitable items. Similar sudden shortages occurred
in the case of soap, matches, aspirin, cigarettes and other items.
The reason for these episodes is that the state still controls most
prices, of which there are many millions. It is impossible for the state
price controllers to set all prices at the levels that will induce profitmaximizing managers to produce just those things that consumers
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most desire. Under central planning, the inability of the price control
lers to set such prices was of little importance, because the ministry
would simply order its enterprises to produce soap and syringes,
regardless of their profitability. But when the ministry no longer has
that right, production can go badly awry if prices do not respond
quickly to shortages.
The lesson of the State Enterprise Law is that before markets can be
expected to work well, a great many different institutional arrange
ments must be in place: legal institutions for enforcing contracts, bank
ing and credit institutions, accounting and auditing institutions, price
determining arrangements, and so forth. If some of them are not yet
functioning, the market system can perform very badly; indeed an
incomplete market system might perform worse than a coherent central
planning system.
Some disruptions of these kinds are an unavoidable cost of transi
tion. It is for this reason that some people advocate a very rapid transi
tion from planning to markets—the faster the better—to minimize
these costs. Too rapid a transition has its own costs, however, for it
leaves too little time to prepare the ground for markets to work prop
erly. Unfortunately, there is very little experience in this type of transi
tion from which informed judgments may be made. In 1917, Russia
was the guinea pig for testing the world's first transition—from mar
kets to planning. Today, the USSR is again a guinea pig, this time for
testing the world's first reverse transition—from planning to markets.

Inflation
Under the best of circumstances, the story of the progress of perestroika should end here, with an account of changes in the two funda
mental features of an economy—ownership rules and the economic
mechanism. Unfortunately, other changes have occurred in the country
that have greatly complicated the transition. The two that are of great
est significance are the onset of inflation and the conflict between the
union and the republics.
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Before 1985, Soviet fiscal and monetary policy had been extremely
conservative. The government budget was roughly in balance from
year to year, and wage payments were under tight control.
Around 1987, things began to come apart. Government expendi
tures continued to rise while revenues began to decline. Some of the
causes were beyond the government's control, such as the Cheraobyl
nuclear plant accident and the Armenian earthquake. Others were the
consequence of ill-advised government policies, such as the fervent
anti-alcoholism campaign that sharply reduced government revenues
from the alcohol tax. The State Enterprise Law, which permitted enter
prises to retain a larger share of their profits, resulted in a further reduc
tion in government revenues.
The consequence was a rapidly increasing government budget defi
cit, which amounted to about 10 percent of the gross national product
in 1989.12 Unable to finance the deficit by domestic or foreign borrow
ing, the government did what beleaguered governments often do in
such straits—it printed new money.
As a result the money incomes of the population increased more
rapidly than the production of the consumer goods and services. In a
market economy, that would have led to price increases—open infla
tion. Marketization of the Soviet economy, however, has not yet
extended to the determination of retail prices by market forces. Prices
are still set by the government and remain fixed for long periods of
time. The rising money incomes of the population are then expressed
in the form of repressed inflation. The weekly delivery of meat to the
state store, which formerly may have lasted for six days, is now all sold
out after five days, then after four days. The population soon learns to
shop early in the week, the queues grow longer, and eventually the
week's delivery is sold out the day it arrives. That is the dynamic that
has led to the grim phenomenon of empty shelves in the state stores
while the unspent cash balances in the hands of the population con
tinue to rise.
These effects of repressed inflation have been disastrous for the
progress of perestroika. It has led to a declining sense of consumer
welfare, which many people blame on the abandonment of tight central
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planning in favor of markets and cooperatives.13 It has reduced con
sumer resistance to the evasion of price controls by profit-seeking state
enterprises. It has fostered the expansion of the black market. The
declining value of a ruble of wages had eroded labor discipline and
work incentives. It has aggravated the hostility to the cooperatives
whose market-based prices diverge more and more from the fixed sub
sidized state-store prices.
The opinion is universal that the restoration of macroeconomic
equilibrium is an absolute precondition to any further progress in perestroika. The government has, in fact, set forth a program for reducing
the deficit, consisting primarily of a reduction in expenditures, but with
some increases in revenues. Despite this broad agreement, it is difficult
to be sanguine about the prospect for arresting the inflationary pres
sures for two reasons, both political.
First, no government finds it easy to eliminate a budget deficit, espe
cially when it involves political commitments to expenditures that
entail a deficit as high as 10 percent of GNP. Even strong governments
find that difficult, and the Soviet Union's government is particularly
weak at this time.
Second, all the plans for perestroika, even the radical 500-day plan,
exclude so-called "essential consumer goods" from the list of com
modities whose prices are to be set free to reach market levels. The
government is to continue to fix the prices of foodstuffs and housing,
presumably at the same low levels that prevailed in the past. Those low
prices, which the population has long grown to regard as one of the
few benefits of socialism, are maintained by government subsidies.
The subsidies on agricultural products alone are now roughly equal to
the entire budget deficit. 14 Neither the government nor its principal crit
ics are prepared to bit the bullet of food price increases. Gorbachev
himself remarked that such price increases "would make the whole
people take to the streets and topple any government."15 Indeed, the
loudest protest against one timid attempt to raise food prices came
from Boris Yeltsin, who represents himself as being impatient with the
slow pace of perestroika.
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One can only conclude that the political leadership across the entire
spectrum is scared to death of the popular reaction to an increase in
basic consumer prices. They do not have the confidence of the Solidar
ity-based government in Poland that they could persuade the people of
the necessity of bearing the hardships that would be involved in such
measures as the introduction of a market-pricing system for all com
modities and the restoration of a balanced budget. As long as these
conditions prevail, the prospect of any significant expansion of market
relationships seems quite remote. It is ironic that this monetary prob
lem, which has nothing to do with perestroika itself, has mushroomed
into a major obstacle to its further progress.

Political Legitimacy
One of the fruits of political liberalization is the intense conflict
between the national government and the member republics. The con
flict is a compound of a number of elements, including ethnic violence
in places like Armenia and Azerbaijan, separatist forces in places like
the Baltic republics, and demands for sovereignty in such republics as
Russia and the Ukraine.
There can be no more fundamental requirement for a stable society
than general agreement on who has the legitimate right to govern. In
the absence of such agreement the society is prey to chaos or civil war
as contending groups struggle for power, each in the conviction of the
rightness of its cause. As the political conflict ripens, it takes its toll on
economic activity. An order from the national government that prices
on luxuries be raised was not enforced in the Russian republic by order
of its government. An increase in the price of meat in Russia caused a
flurry of shipments of meat from the Ukraine to Russia. The Ukrainian
government responded by forbidding the export of meat to Russia.
Ukrainian officials claim that Russia then retaliated by cutting off ship
ments of oil supplies to the Ukraine.16 Similar protectionist skirmishes
have been breaking out all over the union. Foreign investors have
already acknowledged increased uncertainty in business dealings

70 Reconstructing the Soviet Planned Economy

because one cannot be sure that the Soviet signatory of a delivery con
tract will be sustained as having had the lawful right to sign it17
Neither Soviet history nor world history offers much hope that the
deep problem of political legitimacy will be easily solved. One must
expect very turbulent times ahead, perhaps for many years. Until that
issue is somehow resolved—if only provisionally—the prospect is for
little further progress in economic transformation and further deterio
ration in economic performance.
Conclusion

After six years in office, the Gorbachev government has made a
modest start in the transition from the central planning to the new
economy of the future. Instead of universal state ownership of enter
prise, a lawful place has been made for private enterprise. Instead of
total central control over the output of state enterprises, some portion
of that output is now produced by the decisions of the enterprises
themselves, not bound by "state orders."
To those Soviet citizens who saw the election of the new General
Secretary as the beginning of a truly radical transformation of the eco
nomic system, the results thus far are disappointing. Moreover, the
economy today is in a much poorer condition than before 1985. Total
output and consumption per capita are in fact higher than in 1985,18 but
because of the disorder in consumer goods markets, there is a general
feeling of being worse off than before.
If one is of an optimistic disposition, there are some signs of things
happening that may help the transition move forward. Several million
people in the new private sector are learning the managerial and finan
cial skills of business enterprise. Thousands of others have engaged in
joint ventures with foreign capitalist firms and are absorbing the tech
niques of international management and finance. Profits are being
earned and private money capital is accumulating that may one day
serve to purchase the assets of some privatized state enterprises. Man
agers of some state enterprises are learning how to do business with
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each other, instead of taking orders from their ministries, and the rudi
ments of market relationships are spreading. Some republican govern
ments are seeking to curb protectionist impulses, and tentative
accommodations are sometimes arrived at even between such contend
ers as the national government under Gorbachev and the Russian
republican government under Boris Yeltsin.19 Historians may some day
conclude that while the country was absorbed in the dramatic turmoil
of high politics, these grassroots developments were quietly forming
the foundation for a subsequent major transformation of the economy.
While the optimist can find some encouragement in this perspective,
there is little prospect for a sharp resumption of the transition process
in the next year or two. Among the principal reasons are the difficulty
of dealing with the inflation and with the union-republic political con
flict The latter problem in particular has caused the sharp reversal in
the process of political liberalization that Gorbachev has been leading
in the last few months. This conservative reaction may well lead to a
complete halt or even a reversal in the economic process of perestroika, although that is by no means foreordained. Should such a
reversal occur, the old central planning system, perhaps somewhat
modified, may gain a new lease on life. While it may endure for a
period of time, however, there is no reason to expect that the restored
planned economy would perform significantly better than it did in the
past A reaction of that sort would therefore only postpone the date on
which some future General Secretary will be called on to lead a new
effort at economic perestroika,
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Evolution in Perestroika Thinking

Gorbachev announced his intent in 1985 to introduce radical eco
nomic reform to the Soviet Union. He deliberately used the term "radi
cal" to differentiate this reform from the half-hearted reforms of the
past. The perestroika process has been running for over five years and
has yielded few positive results.
The reform thinking of the Soviet leadership has evolved through
three phases, although, it must be noted, the third phase is still in its
infancy. Moreover, no one knows whether the Soviet Union will ever
embark seriously on this third stage.
The first phase of perestroika dates to its first three to four years.
This phase was characterized by naive expectations. It was thought that
with relatively minor tinkering, the Soviet planned economy could be
revived. A simple reduction in bureaucratic meddling plus the massive
Western assistance that would be attracted by political liberalization
would allow the Soviet economy to accelerate (uskorenie).
The second phase began in the 1988-1989 period, when it was
clearly realized that minor tinkering would not yield the desired
results. At this point, the leadership concluded that reform must go
beyond minor repairs and deal with substantive issues. During this
phase, it was determined to weaken the bureaucracy's hold on the
economy and to unleash more local initiative. Although it was realized
75

76 Soviet Bureaucracy and Economic Reform

that fundamental legal, economic, and social reforms in laws and prop
erty rights were required, the argument was that these would take time,
and that one must proceed with caution on introducing fundamental
reform. However, it was felt that positive results would be achieved as
a consequence of reducing the interventionary powers of the bureau
cracy. During this phase, particular attention was devoted to the per
ceived problems of macroeconomic stability. Fundamental reforms
could not be introduced prior to the introduction of stabilizing mea
sures.
The third phase, which remained in its infancy in early 1991, began
with the realization that reform requires dealing with the fundamental
long-range issues. Institutions must be created that support market-like
resource allocation. Property rights, freedom of and protection of con
tracts, and modern banking based upon commercial principles must be
introduced. Although these issues have yet to be addressed concretely
by official reform proposals, they are prominent in the reform packages
put forward by the Yeltsin group—the 500-Day Program.

Issues of Bureaucratic Opposition
What exactly does the Soviet economic bureaucracy want from the
reform process? What is the reform program of the bureaucracy? To a
great extent, whether recognized or not, the interests of the bureau
cracy have been reflected in the reform program of the Ryzhkov and
Pavlov governments. The bureaucratic attitude towards reform can be
characterized by the following propositions.
(1) The economy is not yet ready for markets for a variety of rea
sons, the most prominent being macroeconomic imbalances.
(2) Reform is inevitably a slow process in which substantive
reforms must be introduced gradually.
(3) The costs of rapid reform are too substantial. Reform must be
introduced gradually to limit the social costs.
Why do bureaucrats oppose substantive economic reform? A num
ber of reasons can be suggested, both valid and invalid.
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First, they realize that true economic reform means a loss of jobs
and a reduction in authority and prestige. The reform discussion has
already made them pariahs in their communities.
Second, economic reform is truly a power struggle, a struggle over
who controls economic resources: Who will control diamonds, or oil,
or building permits? These decisions determine who has the power in
society.
Third, among the bureaucracy there is a sincere feeling that the
economy will collapse without centralized directives. Planners and
bureaucrats have an ingrained physical balance mentality that causes
them to fear market allocation. They simply cannot perceive how it
could work. To Soviet bureaucrats, "deficits" are inherent to the econ
omy. They can only be removed by administrative measures, not by
prices.
Although it is generally perceived that Soviet managers form the
natural constituency for radical reform, this is far from the case. There
is a true ambiguity of managerial attitudes towards reform. Experi
enced managers have developed a comfort level with the old system.
They understand that the transition period will be rocky. Moreover, the
outcome of reform is by no means certain. Managers understand that a
half-way reform would likely leave them worse off. Attitudes towards
reform vary depending upon whether managers will have ready mar
kets for their goods both at home and in the West after the marketization has taken place. It is noteworthy that the major organized
opposition to reform from the ranks of managers has come from direc
tors of heavy-industrial establishments.

Bureaucratic Excuses
Bureaucrats put forward a number of reasons for delaying substan
tive reforms and continuing to rely on minor tinkering.
First, bureaucrats cite the specter of inflation. Because Soviet prices
have for decades been kept at artificially low levels, especially retail
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pices, conversion to market resource allocation would mean substan
tial increases in prices.
It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on fear of inflation in the
Soviet Union. Lenin had described inflation as the instrument that can
destroy capitalism, and this thinking has caused Soviet authorities to
have a perhaps irrational fear of inflation, which is shared by the popu
lation. Soviet bureaucrats and authorities confuse the income redistri
bution effects of inflation with the inefficiency effects of inflation. It is
clear that a move to clearing prices will have strong income redistribut
ing effects, and that measures to protect those on fixed incomes must
be put in place. The move to clearing prices, as long as it does not lead
to hyperinflation, however, should have a positive effect on efficiency.
People and managers will, for the first time, make resource allocation
decisions based on relative scarcities. Economic theory has taught that
moderate inflation, if properly anticipated, does not affect real output
and hence efficiency.
Second, Soviet bureaucrats use the specter of monopoly as an
excuse for not moving into the third phase of reform. The administra
tive-command economy has, over the years, created a highly concen
trated industrial structure with individual suppliers having significant
market power. Bureaucrats argue that one cannot use market allocation
with such high levels of concentration. Planners must use their control
of investment decisions to create a system of alternate suppliers before
moving to market allocation.
The process of creating alternate suppliers will be, at best, slow and
gradual. Moreover, it seems unrealistic to rely on the planning struc
ture—which created the monopoly problem in the first place—to cre
ate an optimal industrial structure. Bureaucrats do not understand the
notion that free entry under conditions of market allocation is a more
reliable way to resolve the monopoly problem even though they recog
nize that state pricing rules can be used to limit monopoly profits dur
ing the transition period.
Third, Soviet bureaucrats contend that opening the Soviet economy
will have disastrous consequences unless foreign transactions remain
under the center's strict control. Such concerns are not unusual in a
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country with limited foreign exchange earnings and growing hard cur
rency debt. Other bureaucratic concerns about opening the economy
are less standard. Soviet foreign trade bureaucrats believe that only
"rich" economies can gain from trade. If the Soviet economy enters the
international trade arena as a "poor" economy, it will prove uncompetitive. This type of thinking ignores the fact that comparative advantage
allows both rich and poor countries to benefit from trade, if they spe
cialize according to comparative advantage. The corollary of this
thinking is the belief that the Soviet economy must first become
"wealthy" before it can effectively trade with the West. Insofar as this
"wealth" is a long way off, liberalizing foreign trade must be delayed.
Another nonstandard reason for delaying trade liberalization is the
fear that valuable Soviet resources will be lost. Given the distorted
domestic pricing system, unscrupulous Westerners will take advantage
of pricing "mistakes" in both Soviet products and assets. These pricing
mistakes will allow the Western world to acquire Soviet products and
assets at unreasonably low prices.
The fear of Western exploitation reflects bureaucratic attitudes
towards pricing. The Soviet bureaucrat views prices as instruments to
be controlled by higher authority; under this system, prices do not
change frequently. Even if pricing officials see that particular Soviet
products and assets are being bought by Westerners at alarming rates,
they would not be able to use these pricing signals quickly enough to
raise prices to prevent the exploitation from taking place. Rather than
viewing Western purchases as a means of obtaining valuable informa
tion on scarcity prices, Soviet pricing officials view Western purchases
as a destabilizing threat. Similar fears, for example, prompted high
Soviet officials in early 1991 to warn of Western banking conspiracies
aimed to buying valuable Soviet products and assets at bargain-base
ment prices.
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Chaos and the Command Economy

There has been a substantial dismantling of the Soviet economic
bureaucracy. Staff cuts in Moscow bureaucratic organizations have
averaged 30 percent; the industrial ministries—organizations that pro
vided the glue that held the command system together—have been
hard hit Industrial enterprises no longer answer to the local party sec
retary. It is unclear who can make and enforce decisions in today's
Soviet economy. The balance of power has begun to shift towards the
enterprise and away from the state committees, industrial ministries,
and local party officials. Enterprises no longer automatically fulfill
directives from above.
Restrictions of enterprise autonomy remain most prominent in those
areas most essential to marketization of the Soviet economy. Enter
prises still are not free to set their own prices, acquire their own sup
plies, and complete deals with Western companies. Pricing officials
continue to insist on cost-based pricing formulae that do not reflect
demand and that "protect" the public from excess profits. Industrial
managers must sell deficit products at state-dictated prices that often
provide little or no profit. Few Soviet bureaucrats want wholesale trade
to replace centralized distribution, even though this is a declared goal
of perestroika. In fact, most feel that wholesale trade would worsen
rather than help the troubled material-technical supply system, which
remains the weakest point in the Soviet system.
What reform package would Soviet economic bureaucrats be will
ing to support? They would like to see an economic system in which
roughly half of enterprise output is dictated by state orders. The cen
tralized supply system would be retained, with enterprises allowed to
deal only at the margin in products produced above quotas. Less than
one-quarter of Moscow bureaucrats favor giving enterprises freedom
to set their own prices. The bureaucratic "reform" package falls far
short even of the modest official proposals of the late 1980s. The ste
reotype of bureaucratic opposition to radical reform is accurate. In a
society that has traditionally rewarded bureaucrats for agreeing with
the official line ("perestroika will be a success"), it is remarkable that
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less than half of Moscow bureaucrats feel that perestroika will eventu
ally be successful.
The clear-cut identification of enterprise managers as the major ben
eficiaries of reform conceals an interesting ambiguity. Managers fear a
move away from key features of the old system. The enterprise manag
er's fear of the unknown is understandable. In a chaotic system that
mixes command and market elements, that assigns arbitrary prices,
taxes away excess profits, and fails to assign clear property rights, who
can predict whether the experienced manager's lot will be improved?
Soviet managers would obviously prefer a well-functioning market
system if presented a choice. Enough of them have seen it at work in
Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Managerial support for
the more comfortable aspects of the old system reflects the lack of faith
in the ability of the Soviet leadership to devise a nonchaotic system
that combines market and plan.
Neither the Soviet bureaucrat nor the enterprise manager appears to
understand how a market economy works. Sixty years of command
system have taught both groups to think in terms of administrative bal
ancing of supplies and demand. Goods are inherently in deficit. Short
ages can only be eliminated by producing more. Raising the price has
nothing to do with the "deficitness" of the commodity. Soviet bureau
crats believe in the visible hand of administrative methods. They
openly worry about where the wheat, steel, shoes, and cigarettes will
come from if they are not planned from above. In addition to personal
concerns for their jobs and livelihood, Soviet bureaucrats are con
vinced that the economy could not continue to function in an orderly
manner without them.
The limited economic reform that has taken place appears to have
made things worse, as evidenced by declining growth, supply crises,
hoarding, strikes, and rising inflation. The explanation is quite simple:
Perestroika has dismantled much of the Soviet command system prior
to establishing a new market order. The chaos associated with the ero
sion of the planned order threatens public and official support for radi
cal reform. The Soviet public and the Soviet leadership may associate
chaos with market reform rather than with the collapse of the com-
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mand system. Moreover, the fear of the chaos inherent in a partial
reform, could deprive the reform movement of its natural constituents,
the industrial managers.
Can "command" be restored to an economy that has experienced the
first steps of decentralization? Both enterprise managers and Moscow
bureaucrats agree that local party influence over the economy has
largely disappeared. They agree that the influence of industrial minis
tries and state committees has fallen considerably. Managers now pick
and choose the directives they are prepared to implement. Ad hoc decisionmaking has replaced the old rules and regulations of the adminis
trative-command economy.
We return to the issue of the optimal phasing of reform. The phasing
chosen by the Soviet leadership has, obviously, not been successful.
The Soviet leadership has chosen, as a first step, to dismantle signifi
cant elements of the command apparatus (most particularly the minis
try command system) and to give enterprises new but restricted
freedoms. Moreover, the local party command element has largely dis
appeared. The glue that once held the command system together has
disappeared, and a new form of glue has yet to be put in place—
namely, the discipline of the market.
The Soviet economy finds itself lacking disciplinary forces, either
from the side of command or from the side of markets. The monetary
control system that was previously based upon strict governmental and
political control of monetary emissions has dissipated into an ineffec
tive system designed to win political allies. Strict wage increase formu
lae (wages should not increase more rapidly than productivity) have
been laid aside. Enterprises, with strengthened workers' collectives
now set their own wage increases, still without a hard budget con
straint. The central budget is in chaos because of the failure to resolve
center-republic relations, and budget deficits must be covered by print
ing money. Strikes represent a thorny problem because market forces
are not providing information on which wage requests to grant and
which to deny.
These events cause one to question whether a cautious, phased
reform will work. Moreover, it threatens loss of political support for
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reform. The "cold turkey" approach, judging by the Polish experience,
causes substantial output declines and a substantial upward movement
in prices in the reform's first phase. However, under the cold turkey
approach, the eventual benefits should be felt in the relatively near
future. This sense may allow public support for reform to endure the
difficult first phase. Under the Soviet gradualist approach, a slow hem
orrhage becomes a faster hemorrhage, and there is no end in sight to
the problem. To expect public support for reform to continue in this
environment is unrealistic.
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The Basic Difficulty Facing the Soviet Economy

The fundamental issue facing Soviet economic reform today is the
problem of transition from a centralized to a decentralized economic
system. Even if the design for a new economic mechanism were per
fect, the dominant problem would still be: how do you get there from
here. This paper will focus on the issue of transition—its meaning and
its consequences for the progress of Soviet economic reform.
It is important to note from the start that while there is abundant
Western theory to help Soviet economists design a market system,
there is no available theory of transition from a centralized arrange
ment of economic institutions to a decentralized one. Western econo
mists have not been concerned with this issue, since the development
of decentralized economic mechanisms in the West took place slowly
over long periods of time spanning more than a century. And Soviet
economists themselves have only recently begun to work on the issue.
Previously it was not a subject of concern, since radical market-type
reform itself was not openly discussed. Hence there are no theoretical
guides, either Western or Soviet, that Soviet leaders and economists
can draw upon as they attempt to deal with the problems of transition.
At the base of the transition problem is the interrelated nature of an
economic system. One element of the system cannot be changed with
out changing other elements if true change in economic behavior is to
85
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be achieved. Thus, to give Soviet managers decisionmaking power
over what they are to produce, they must also be given the power to
decide what inputs they will use: materials, labor, and machinery.
First, if managers are to have the power to decide what materials
they will use, the centralized system of material supply, introduced in
the 1930s, has to be abolished and a system of wholesale trade put in
its place. But given the widespread nature of material shortages in
Soviet industry, there is a fear that the removal of the centralized mate
rials rationing system will exacerbate these shortages and cause mas
sive disequilibria in the economy. Supporters of reform, however,
argue that the rationing system itself contributes to the appearance of
shortages, because managers, operating within the administrative cen
tralized supply system, order an excessive amount of inputs to protect
themselves against the inefficiencies and uncertainties of the command
system.
Second, Soviet managers have to be given increased power over the
hiring and firing of workers. If managers are to be encouraged to seek
out and adopt advanced technology in the pursuit of the reform's goal
of economic modernization, they have to have the right to adjust their
labor force to the quantity and quality levels appropriate to the new
technology. This means giving managers the right not only to fire
workers who are malingering, but also those who are working hard but
who are made redundant by the new technology. Thus the extensive
job security enjoyed by Soviet workers, especially during the Brezhnev
period, will be diminished. But as many Soviet economists argue, the
Soviet guarantee of lull employment should guarantee the Soviet
worker a job, not guarantee his job. Institutional arrangements will
have to be expanded for handling unemployment and for the retraining
and redistribution of labor.
Third, managers have to have the power to acquire the capital equip
ment that they decide they need. This again involves the abolition of
the centralized system of materials and equipment supply and its
replacement with a market system of wholesale trade. It also involves
the question of investment and credit. If managers are to have the
power to acquire capital equipment on their own, then they have to
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have access to the financial means to acquire this equipment. More
over, to maintain the goal of decentralization, the banking institutions
that decide on the allocation of investment credit must also be decen
tralized and should make their decisions upon the commercial creditworthiness of loan applicants rather than on any centralized investment
plan.
If this freedom for Soviet managers to acquire the inputs they decide
they need is not to lead to rampant inflation, their demands must be
constrained. With the removal of centralized control over supplies and
labor, the constraint that must be instituted is a hard budget constraint.
That is, managers must be required to cover the cost of their inputs out
of the revenues they earn. If they fail to do so, the process of bank
ruptcy must be enforced. Without the vulnerability to bankruptcy, the
freeing-up of managerial decisionmaking will not work.
Furthermore, if managers are to make their own output and input
decisions, independent of central planners, they will need meaningful
signals with regard to economic costs and benefits so that the pursuit of
profit will lead to the efficient use of resources. Otherwise, decentral
ized decisionmaking will lead to substantial inefficiency and waste.
This means the Soviet price system will have to undergo radical
reform. Not only will subsidies have to be removed, but the system for
setting prices will have to be changed. Buyers and sellers must be
given the right to negotiate their own prices in a free and flexible way
so that prices adequately reflect the conditions of supply and demand
in the economy.
The reform of the Soviet economy is, in essence, a monetization of
economic transactions and decisionmaking. The target planning of the
command system is to be replaced by producer and user decisionmak
ing involving magnitudes calibrated in monetary terms. Therefore,
monetary stability becomes critical. Issues of macroeconomic policy
and control—the size of the money supply and of the government defi
cit—become of great importance. If the required monetary control is
not exercised and if reasonable monetary stability is not achieved and
maintained before and along with the introduction of the reforms, then
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the resulting surge of inflation will seriously weaken or destroy the
effectiveness of the reform.
Finally, the reforms described so far may not work in the absence of
one further element, namely, competition. Without the introduction of
competition, without buyers being given a choice among competing
suppliers, decentralization may not lead to the meeting of customer
demands, efficiency, and technological dynamism, but to monopoly
and the danger of continued technological stagnation and price infla
tion. Therefore, an additional element of the required set of reforms
may be the introduction of a Soviet antitrust policy.
What all of this means is that due to the interrelatedness of an eco
nomic system, a number of reforms must be introduced more or less
simultaneously in order for economic reform to begin to have any
effect In other words, to get the rocket of economic reform off the
launching pad, an initial bundle of simultaneous reforms is required.
One of the aims of an economic theory and policy of transition should
be the pursuit of "minimum simultaneity," i.e., the development of a
minimum bundle of simultaneous reforms required to launch the eco
nomic reform. For if everything has to be done at once, then the intro
duction of a decentralizing reform would face overwhelming obstacles.
Especially under conditions of extensive market disequilibria, an
abrupt shift from a centralized system to a full price-profit-marketmoney system would produce chaos.
In the elaboration of a theory of transition, it is necessary that the
destabilization produced by the introduction of institutional changes be
constrained to a level that allows the economy to continue to function.
Certainly this is a policy constraint demanded by political leaders.
Officials at Gosplan and the economic ministries are criticized for con
tinuing to operate in the old ways. But at the same time, they are held
responsible for the performance of the economy. The only way these
officials know how to carry out this responsibility is by means of the
old planning and control methods.
The key problem here is that the leaders want reform, but they want
to bring it about without acutely destabilizing the economy. The main
tenance of some of the old forms of planning and control is necessary

Soviet Economic Reform 89

to prevent destabilization. Thus, the transition process initially
involves the introduction of new forms alongside the old forms, rather
than immediately in place of them, with the idea that the new forms are
to grow and in time replace the old forms. This growth and replace
ment process is, however, not well understood. To what extent does the
maintenance of old forms inhibit, or even prevent, the development
and growth of new forms, and what is the nature of the replacement
process if it does take place?
There is, in addition, another underlying tension in the politics-eco
nomics relationship. An effective economic mechanism is one that pro
duces rapid adjustment to changing conditions, to changes in
technology and changes in people's desires. But adjustment involves
the pain of dislocation. It reduces people's security. It affects rewards
and penalties and the distribution of income. A socialist system politi
cizes the allocation of pain. A capitalist market system tends to depoliticize it. Though people in all countries look to their governments for
protection against pain, in socialist countries this feeling is particularly
strong. Thus there is the danger that the political pressure for govern
ment protection and intervention will prevent the economy from ade
quately adjusting to change, thus inhibiting the progress of economic
reform or limiting its effectiveness.

The Record of Reform
When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, his initial eco
nomic program was focused on the re-invigoration, rather than the
reform, of the economy. Gorbachev called for growth acceleration and
economic modernization based upon sharp increases in investment
directed toward machine building and energy, plus extensive changes
in administrative and management personnel. It was not until June
1987 that discussion of serious economic reform began. At a meeting
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, a resolution
calling for the radical restructuring of the Soviet economy was
adopted. The resolution recognized that the interrelatedness of an eco-
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nomic system required a bundle of changes to be made for any real
change in the functioning of the economy to result. It did not, however,
appear to recognize the difficulties of transition that would be
involved.
The June 1987 resolution was accompanied by a new law on the
state enterprise. Together they formed a program which promised a
substantial move toward economic decentralization. The program
called for the virtual abolition of the annual state plan and its obliga
tory targets, significant independence of enterprise managers from con
trol by the center and the industrial ministries, enterprise incentives
based on the pursuit of profit and financial responsibility, flexibility in
the payment and allocation of labor, and reform of prices and the sys
tem of price formation. The new system was to be in place by the
beginning of the 1990s. Until then, some aspects of centralization were
to be retained, e.g., the so-called "state production orders," which were
obligatory for the enterprises to fulfill.
A year later, in June 1988, Gorbachev launched a radical political
reform affecting both central and local governments. An elected con
gress of people's deputies was created, which in turn elected a presi
dent and a legislative parliament (Supreme Soviet). And local councils
(Soviets) were to be directly elected by the people. Gorbachev appears
to have concluded that political reform is a necessary precondition for
economic reform. In order for economic reform to succeed, decisionmakers must have the information they need to make decisions, and
they must be free of arbitrary government intervention in carrying out
their decisions. Leaders in government and in the economy must be
accountable for the results of the actions they take. They must have
credibility in the eyes of the people. Thus, glasnost and democratization are prerequisites for successful economic reform.
What can be said about the accomplishments of radical economic
reform so far since its launching at the June 1987 meeting of the Cen
tral Committee of the Soviet Communist party? Clearly, little progress
has been made. The reform is barely off the launching pad. And there
are a number of highly serious and troublesome developments, in par
ticular the growth of inflationary forces, the spreading shortages of
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consumer goods, and the recent decreasing levels of output Indeed, a
thick cloud of crisis hangs over the economy and the people's expecta
tions for the future are bleak.
Among the major causes of the present situation, it can be argued, is
first of all an initial lack of sufficient understanding and appreciation
by Soviet economists and leaders of the macroeconomic factors
involved in the transition to a decentralized economic mechanism.
Wage inflation (and through it, price inflation) has been a direct func
tion of money creation resulting from (1) the government deficit,
which has been substantial (even when account is taken of the fact that
in the Soviet Union most of the investment in the economy is on the
government budget), and (2) enterprise managers' pressure to increase
money wages far beyond increases in productivity, given the flexibility
of the incentive wage system accompanying the reform. Much of the
current problem of empty shelves and consumer goods shortages is
demand-related, that is, a consequence of the sizable increases in
money wages which would not have been possible except for the
action of the printing presses bloating the supply of money and the
growth of the monetary overhang in the economy.
There has also, however, been a slowdown in the growth of output.
This has been a result of the fact that, while some of the glue of the old
administrative-command methods of management that held the econ
omy together has been removed, and new economic methods of man
agement have not developed fast enough to replace it. The first element
of the economic mechanism to be affected has been that of interenterprise flows of materials. The coordination mechanism in the economy
has been seriously weakened leading to a slowing down of growth and,
this year, an actual decrease in output.
A further critical flaw has been the failure to introduce price reform.
The maintenance of below-market-clearing prices, often through the
payment of subsidies, contributes to the government deficit and to the
prevalence of goods shortages. And the maintenance of the centralized
system of price setting means that prices are not flexible signals of the
relationship between supply and demand.
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Thus the simultaneity problem in the transition to a decentralized
economic system has proved to be a formidable barrier to the progress
of Soviet economic reform.
In light of the failure of economic reform to get started and the
growing sense of crisis in the country, several important developments
have occurred with regard both to increased understanding of the eco
nomic issues and the working out of proposed programs for economic
reform, particularly for the handling of the issue of transition.
First there has been a growing understanding among Soviet econo
mists of the principles and importance of macroeconomic policies. Fis
cal and monetary policies are discussed in a clear and straightforward
manner, with the stress placed on the role they will play in the
reformed Soviet market economy, particularly their role in managing
inflation. Much attention in the public discussion of economic reform
has been given to the monetary overhang and to ways of stopping its
growth and of decreasing it: taxing excessive increase in money wages,
and sale of shares, bonds, and apartments to the public.
Another important development in economic discussions over the
past year has been the increasing focus on property rights and the cre
ation of new diverse nonstate property relations. "Destatization" has
become a rallying cry. What is of great importance here is the growing
perception that a profit incentive is not enough to give an enterprise
manager the needed sense of responsibility for the economic assets
under his control. An ownership relationship is also necessary. Owner
ship brings with it not only an interest in an increase in the flow of
profit (income) but also an interest in an increase in the value of the
property (wealth), which leads to the protection and nurturing of soci
ety's assets.
In addition to the progress in understanding economic issues, there
have been two or three major programs for economic reform put forth
in the last year, each with a strong focus on the transition issue.
First, there was a report issued in October 1989 by the State Com
mission on Economic Reform headed by the economist Abalkin, a
Deputy Prime Minister in the Ryzhkov government. The report out
lines a design for a future Soviet market economy and discusses in
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some detail the measures to be taken to move the Soviet economy
through the transition from a centralized structure to a future decentral
ized market structure.
The vision of a reformed Soviet economy spelled out in the report
goes far beyond that proposed in the resolution of June 1987. While
that resolution was ambiguous about the extent to which the new sys
tem would be a market economy, the Abalkin report unambiguously
envisions a market economy. It states that, on the basis of Soviet expe
rience, there clearly is no reliable alternative to a market mechanism as
a means of coordinating the action and interests of economic units. It
goes on to state that the market is also the most democratic form of
regulating economic activity. The Abalkin report makes clear that a
market system contains an array of markets. In addition to goods mar
kets (for both consumer goods and producer goods), it includes finan
cial markets (markets for securities and a stock market) and labor
markets.
The report stresses that in the reformed economy there will be many
forms of property ownership: leasing and cooperatives, farmer and
peasant property, joint-stock companies, corporations, joint-ventures,
and private property (though private individual property will not be
permitted to lead to the "exploitation of man by man"). The report also
declares that the state should transfer the administration of the eco
nomic property that it retains to the workers' collectives on the basis of
lease contracts.
According to the report, the financial sector, fiscal and monetary and
banking institutions, should be thoroughly developed. And the state
should exercise its influence on the economy through a wide assort
ment of economic means, fiscal and monetary policies, rather than
administrative controls.
Finally, extensive attention is paid in the design of the reformed
economy and (elsewhere in the report) to social guarantees for all
members of society, including those with few skills.
A major part of the report is devoted to the issue of transition. Three
possible approaches are discussed. What are termed the conservative
and radical approaches are dismissed, the first because it will never
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produce any progress in reform and the second because it will lead to
chaos. What is called the "radical-moderate" approach is the one pre
ferred. In essence it is a step-by-step approach for preparing and then
introducing a bundle of simultaneous reforms which include a welldeveloped set of government fiscal and monetary controls. These will
be used to manage the inflation which is inevitable with the introduc
tion of markets in an environment of shortages. Extensive attention in
the report is also paid to the protection of the people in light of the
painful adjustments required. This protection will help people adapt to
a market system. Included here is the indexation of incomes and pen
sions. It is clearly aimed at reviving popular support for the economic
reform and the movement to the market.
The report also sketches out a schedule for the transition to the
reformed economic system. Four stages are described covering the
periods 1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1995, and 1996-2000, by the end of
which a new economic system will be established.
The report was discussed at a large conference of economists in
November, where it was criticized from both the right and the left.
Conservatives attacked the conversion of the Soviet economy to a mar
ket economy. And the radicals attacked what they considered to be the
excessive protection of workers from the economic adjustments which
they argued were necessary for the success of economic reform, i.e.,
the creation of a flexible, efficient, responsive economic mechanism.
In December, Prime Minister Ryzhkov stated that he supported the
Abalkin program, but called for a two-year delay in its introduction,
during which heavy centralized priority would be put on increasing the
production of consumer goods to eradicate consumer shortages. This
echo of the administrative-command approach was not well received.
It was followed in May 1990 by a formal government plan put forth by
Ryzhkov that was similar in some ways to the Abalkin program, but it
called for beginning the transition to a market economy with an imme
diate (July 1990) doubling of basic food prices, coupled with indexing
of wages and pensions. This was rejected by the Soviet parliament, and
Ryzhkov and Abalkin were instructed to return in September with a
revised program.
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In the interim, dramatic changes were taking place in the Soviet
political scene. Power was shifting from the Communist Party to the
elected government bodies and from the Kremlin to the republics. In
April 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian repub
lic. He made clear his intentions to assert Russian republic sovereignty
over the economy of the Russian republic, and his intention to move
the republic quickly—in 500 days—to a market economy. At the end
of the Soviet Communist party congress in July, Yeltsin left the party,
strengthening his position as an independent political force.
Gorbachev thus faced a serious challenge, particularly sharp in the
economic sector. He responded with a compromising approach. A joint
Gorbachev-Yeltsin working group was set up at the end of July, under
the direction of the respected economist Shatalin, a member of Gor
bachev's Presidential Council, with the task of drawing up a program
for the transition to a market economy. The working group met during
the month of August and at the beginning of September submitted a
lengthy report, including drafts of over 20 laws, which comprised a
program for the transition to a market economy in 500 days.
The essence of the Shatalin transition program was quite different
from that of Ryzhkov and Abalkin. The heart of the program lay in the
rapidity of the transition process, in the dominant role it gave to priva
tization and to stabilization, and in its recognition of the sovereignty of
the republics as the foundation for the creation of an economic union.
The rapidity of the transition process was symbolized by the phrase
"500 days." This timeframe was not to be taken literally, but it repre
sented a commitment to move ahead resolutely with a tightly
sequenced bundle of reforms, recognizing the simultaneity problem.
Such a commitment was critical in establishing the credibility of the
reform program, which in turn was so important for the program's suc
cess. Furthermore, the Shatalin group made clear that they were talking
about the transition to a market system, not the full development of
such a system. The latter, it was generally acknowledged, would take
several decades.
Second, the transition to the market was to be built on the basis of
privatization rather than on the decentralization of state enterprise
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management. Privatization was to proceed from the top (turning state
enterprises into joint-stock companies) and from the bottom (helping
private people to set up small and medium-sized firms, with credit and
access to space and materials). Financial institutions necessary for
privatization (stock markets, commodity exchanges, etc.) were to be
setup.
Third, stabilization policies were to be introduced immediately.
Investment financed through the state budget was to be cut sharply as
were the defense and KGB budgets. Tight monetary policy was to be
initiated. Monetary reform through confiscation was to be avoided.
Rather, the monetary overhang was to be absorbed through the
increased supply of consumer goods (production and imports) and
sales to the public of apartments and a range of state assets. The prices
of up to 150 basic consumer goods were to remain fixed for the entire
period of one-and-one-half years. Reform of other prices was to start as
soon as the stabilization program began to take hold.
The aim of the stabilization program was to make the ruble the
accepted, totally fungible, legal tender throughout the Soviet Union. As
some members of the Shatalin group put it, the aim was to make the
ruble "real money."
The fourth key element in the approach of the Shatalin program was
that it started with the recognition of the sovereignty of the republics,
and it tried to create institutional arrangements that would encourage
the republics to give up some of their sovereignty in order to share in
the benefits of these arrangements. A good example of such an institu
tion was the proposed central bank, which was designed along the lines
of the American Federal Reserve System. The board of governors of
the bank consisted of a chairman and representatives from each of the
republics. Thus each republic that joined the system would have a
voice in the setting of monetary policy for the entire economic union.
The battleground is now in the political arena. As the old economic,
social, and political structures are being destroyed, and new structures
are slow in developing, instability is increasing. To deal with the situa
tion, it is necessary for Soviet political leaders, primarily Gorbachev
and Yeltsin, to reach certain agreements. First, they must agree on the
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nature of the new Soviet political union and the level of sovereignty of
the republics. Without this, the political power to implement economic
reform is lost And second, they must agree on a program of economic
reform, one that addresses the major problems of transition—"mini
mum simultaneity," property rights, and macroeconomic balance. Two
different approaches have already been proposed and more are possi
ble. If they come to an agreement soon, then there is a chance that by
the turn of the century the Soviet economy will look substantially dif
ferent from what it was and is today, and will begin to show signs of
becoming a market economy with economic, financial, and legal insti
tutions resembling those of the advanced industrial nations.
If, on the other hand, there is great delay in the political acceptance
and introduction of significant transition measures, then the disequilibria and instability in the economy will intensify and the reimposition of
economic controls will be likely. Where this path will lead is not clear.
It can be argued, however, that since recentralization will not solve the
problems facing the Soviet economy, another cycle of economic
reform will be initiated in five to ten years. In perestroika II, Soviet
leaders and the Soviet people, with the experience they have gained,
may be more successful in dealing with economic reform and its tran
sition problems, and a Soviet market economy may begin to take shape
toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The Economic Transformation
of Eastern Europe
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The countries of Eastern Europe, and particularly the more devel
oped ones—Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland—are undergoing
three distinct but interrelated processes. The first is the process of tran
sition, whereby the system of central planning and the ideologicallybased primacy of social ownership of capital is replaced by a system
where markets and market-based allocations of resources play a pri
macy role and where private ownership of the means of production
assumes a significant, if not at first predominant, role. In the long run,
the success of this transition is the critical economic issue for the
region. Short-term changes in output or economic welfare cannot mask
either the shortcomings of the old economic system or the potential
inherent in the market system. Nevertheless, the potential that markets
and private property hold for the economic future of Eastern Europe
will not be realized quickly or easily. A measure of economic knowl
edge, wise governance, and policymaking and a political system that
can maintain a balance between responsiveness to the popular will and
political expediency are the least that will be needed.
The second economic process going on in Eastern Europe involves
managing the short-term macroeconomic shocks to which the region is
subject. Framing the proper responses to these shocks is first, for the
NOTE: The author is indebted to the Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale
Studien in Koln for providing a productive working environment for the writing of this paper and
to their fellowship program, sponsored by the Volkswagen Stiftung, for financial support
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rejection of Communism had much to do with its economic failures.
Thus today's governments in Eastern Europe face a legacy of deterio
rating economic conditions.
In Czechoslovakia and Hungary the past decade has yielded stag
nant or deteriorating incomes, while in Poland the worsening of eco
nomic performance has been, as Table 1 shows, more precipitous. Less
easy to quantify but equally serious has been the worsening environ
mental degradation of the region, the extent of which is evident even to
the casual visitor and the effects of which have resulted in a dramatic
decline in health for the region's populations. To these long-term
trends are now added inflation and unemployment. Having put up with
the empty economic promises of the Communist regimes for over 40
years, and having experienced declining living standards for the past
10 to 15 years people in these countries are impatient for palpable
signs of economic progress. It is unlikely that they are willing to accept
long-term solutions that call for greater sacrifice today in return for
promises of a better, but distant, future. Thus, governments in the
region have only a limited amount of political capital and limited room
to maneuver. Policymakers must seek to produce concrete and visible
gains in the short run without adopting policies that are expedient or
simply benefit politically powerful groups at the expense of appropri
ate long-run policies.
The third process is one of rejoining the world economy. The pattern
of trade that emerged in the Communist era, emphasizing the role of
the Soviet Union as the major trade partner of the Eastern European
countries and, perhaps more perniciously, limiting economic competi
tion from and with market economies, was a major source of the eco
nomic shortcomings of the Eastern European economies. Thus, a
redirection of trade toward the West offers both an injection of modern
technology and know-how, as well as of competition and economic
rationality that should benefit the countries of Eastern Europe. Unfor
tunately, the potential benefits of this turn toward the West are being
outweighed by the negative consequences of its abrupt and partly
involuntary nature, which is the result of the collapse of the Soviet
economy and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
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(CMEA), the organization that facilitated trade among these countries.
This collapse of trade has led both to a more drastic shift in trade pat
terns and to a greater decline in the volume of trade of these countries
than was desired. Moreover, the shift toward the West has occurred at a
time when western economic growth has slowed, thus diminishing the
short-term capacity of world markets to absorb the exports of Eastern
Europe.
Table 1

Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Changes in Net Material Product in Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland, 1979-1989
Percent Change in Net Material Product in:
Poland
Hungary
Czechoslovakia
-2.3
1.2
3.1
-6.0
-0.9
2.9
-0.1
-12.0
2.5
-5.5
2.6
0.2
6.0
0.3
2.3
5.6
2.5
3.5
-1.4
3.4
3.0
4.9
0.9
2.6
1.9
4.1
2.1
4.9
0.3
2.4
-2.0
0.3
1.3

SOURCE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in
1989-1990. New York: United Nations, 1990.

These three processes interact with each other, often in ways that
seem unpredictable to policymakers and that are not clearly understood
by the population. Thus, if we are to have a clear view of Eastern
Europe's current economic situation and a realistic appraisal of its
future prospects, we need to disentangle the processes in order to
understand how they are likely to influence Eastern Europe's economic
future.
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The Economics and Politics of Transition

A transition from a socialist, centrally planned economy to a capital
ist, market-oriented one requires the creation of markets and of the
institutions that support and facilitate market processes; the privatiza
tion or at least "de-etatization" of productive capital; and the creation
of a set of mechanisms that will allow the government to maintain con
trol over macroeconomic aggregates and to provide an appropriate
level of public services without interfering excessively with microeconomic processes in the economy.
The Conceptual Issues of Creating Markets

One difficulty with creating markets is that freeing prices tends to
create inflation, which may cause social backlash against reform or
unleash an inflationary spiral that would destroy markets. In some
countries, such as pre-1989 Poland, there was a severe macroeconomic
disequilibrium, characterized by large cash holdings among the popu
lation, a shortage of goods at existing and artificially low prices, and a
large government deficit that continued to fuel the growth of the
money supply. Even in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary
where there was less of an imbalance between the demand for and the
supply of goods, the existing pattern of prices was badly distorted.
Prices of food, housing, and energy were too low, largely the result of
consumption and production subsidies.
Thus, the liberalization of prices would have two effects. The first
would be to increase the general price level so as to reflect the existing
monetary overhang. While such an increase, if matched by equal
increases in real wages, acts largely to reduce the value of cash hoards,
it nevertheless has important implications for the distribution of
income because older or wealthier individuals, who have a greater
stock of savings, lose at the expense of younger or poorer individuals.
At the same time, it is not possible to tie all incomes to the price level,
and thus pensioners and public servants, whose incomes are relatively
inflexible in nominal terms, tend to be obvious victims of such a gen-
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eral price increase. The latter groups, along with other low-income
individuals, are also especially vulnerable to the second effect of price
liberalization, the change in relative prices that operates largely to raise
the price of highly subsidized necessities such as food, clothing, and
shelter. Since such goods make up a very large share of the budget of
low-income consumers, price reform is seen as causing large and, from
the standpoint of social justice, unacceptable changes in the distribu
tion of income. Indeed, to the extent that the former low prices of con
sumer goods were maintained by a combination of shortages,
subsidies, and low wages, raising prices to unsubsidized market levels
can be seen as replacing an invisible system of taxes with one that is
visible and thus more unpopular.
Changes in prices will also alter the financial fortunes of many firms
and of the workers employed by them. However, there are as yet no
clear provisions for bankruptcy. It is true that laws on bankruptcy have
been enacted in most Eastern European countries, but there have been
few or no bankruptcies. In part, this is due to a misunderstanding of
managerial incentives for declaring bankruptcy. Specifically, the East
ern European bankruptcy legislation implicitly assumes that it will be
the managers of loss-making firms who will declare their firms bank
rupt. However, both to retain their jobs and because of unfailing human
optimism, it is not the managers of loss-making firms who opt for
bankruptcy, either in western market economies or in Eastern Europe.
Instead, it is the creditors of the failing firm who force the bankruptcy,
largely in an effort to obtain some part of the equity in the failing firm,
so as to secure the loans they have made to the firm. Unfortunately,
Eastern European enterprises, like the majority of state-owned firms in
other countries, lack equity; they are financed largely by debt, and con
sequently bankruptcy provides little prospect to creditors of obtaining
assets that can cover any significant portion of their loans to the failing
firm. Thus, like the managers of the failing firms, banks and other cred
itors are forced to rely on optimism and to hope that debtor firms can
return to profitability. As a consequence, the structure of production
fails to adjust to price signals as rapidly as it should while, at the same
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time, the financial system is increasingly undermined by the accumu
lated debt of unprofitable firms.
Finally, the creation of markets requires the creation of institutions
such as commodities and stock exchanges and the enactment of busi
ness and commercial laws. The complex task of creating this institu
tional and legal infrastructure entails both conceptual and practical
difficulties. On the one hand, it is argued that the most modern institu
tional arrangements available in the West, and particularly in the Euro
pean Community (EC), with which many Eastern European countries
wish to align themselves, should be introduced as quickly as possible.
The argument for this strategy is that it will provide institutions which,
because of their modernity, will last a long time and provide a stable
institutional framework for the development of the market. Moreover,
institutions will facilitate trade and investment with the West due to
their similarity to western laws and institutions. The pursuit of this
strategy has led to some seemingly bizarre results. For example, the
organization and high level of computerization envisioned in the legal
framework creating a stock exchange in Poland ensure that it can han
dle a volume of transactions comparable to the United States stock
exchanges; yet the number of shareholders and the volume of stock
currently bought and sold in Poland are such that they could be quite
adequately transacted and recorded by means of the bookkeeping tech
nology of the Victorian era.
This dichotomy between the most up-to-date laws and institutions
and the primitive state of the market has led some economists to argue
for a more evolutionary approach. They point out that institutions arise
and disappear in response to the specific needs of their environment.
Under a given set of economic conditions, a given institution will arise
if it can provide a useful service at minimal resource cost, and the same
institution will be cast aside when its services either are no longer
needed or are provided more cheaply by some other institution. Thus,
for example, at some volume of stock trades, an informal system of
curb brokers, such as the precursor of the New York Stock Exchange,
may be most efficient, while only with a higher volume of trades do a
formal stock exchange and computerization make economic sense. In a
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more general sense, since the Eastern European economies differ from
those of the West in more fundamental ways, such as the level of
development, the degree of privatization, the size distribution of firms,
and the extent of foreign ownership, it is argued that a more evolution
ary approach permitting institutions appropriate to this environment to
arise and compete for survival would make greater sense than would
the wholesale importing of western institutions.
The drafting of laws has been characterized by a similar debate.
Some argue that foreign laws, often those of EC countries, should sim
ply be translated and enacted tout court. The difficulty is that there are
insufficient legal scholars to translate the necessary laws so that law
makers are forced to draft their own instead. In any case, most laws are
rather simple frameworks that must be filled in through the accumula
tion of precedents that arise as the courts apply the laws to concrete sit
uations. This fact has led to efforts to revive the business codes
existing in these countries during the inter-War period. The problem
with this approach is that such codes are often outdated and thus do not
apply to modern-day business practices or to modern technologies.
Moreover, they differ from EC law and thus tend to create obstacles to
trade between Eastern and Western Europe.
The Conceptual Issues of Privatization

Even more difficult from a conceptual point of view than the cre
ation of markets is the privatization of state-owned property, which
includes not only virtually all industrial enterprises, but also agricul
tural and urban land, as well as commercial and residential buildings.
Privatizing this property involves difficult tradeoffs between three
desiderata: equity, efficiency, and practicality. An equitable distribution
of property would be one that was fair to the residents of the country.
One element of fairness is that owners of property seized by the Com
munist regime should be entitled to some form of restitution. While the
notion of restitution seems quite reasonable, its implementation has
been something of a political football. Thus, different types of prop
erty, e.g., large vs. small firms, agricultural vs. urban land, as well as
different property owners, e.g., those who emigrated vs. those who did
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not, foreign vs. domestic, those whose property was seized after the
Communist takeover vs. those whose property was seized beforehand,
most notably Jews whose property was seized during the Nazi occupa
tion, have been treated differently by the legislation on restitution.
There is also the problem that simply returning specific pieces of prop
erty to owners after 40 years may either undercompensate them if, for
example, their property has been run down, or overcompensate them if
the state has made significant investments in the property over the past
40 years. In general, small shops and houses have been the easiest to
return to former owners. Industrial property is more problematic and
agricultural land is likely to be the thorniest issue of all.
Once restitution has been carried out, it then remains to put the rest
of the assets to be privatized into the hands of the public in a way that
is equitable. It is generally agreed that distributional equity in this case
means allocation that gives each citizen a relatively equal share of the
value of assets to be privatized. One immediate obstacle to this is that
it is impossible to value the assets being privatized with any degree of
accuracy. Each firm, of course, has a book value, but in the distorted
economic systems of Eastern Europe, even more than in market econo
mies, the book value has little to do with the economic value of an
asset. Thus, any privatization scheme, other than the cumbersome one
giving each citizen an identical portfolio of assets being privatized,
stands the chance of being rejected on grounds of ex ante inequality.
Worse, once markets are introduced, the economic, rather than book
keeping, values of the privatized firms will reveal themselves as share
prices of profit-making firms rise and those of unprofitable firms sink.
The result may be an exceptionally rapid, and therefore socially and
politically unacceptable, redistribution of wealth from one that was ex
ante relatively egalitarian to one that has become, ex post, quite
unequal.
A major objective of privatization is to improve the efficiency of the
firms. Under state ownership, firms were neither subject to the threat of
bankruptcy nor induced to maximize profits. Rather, their managers
pursued policies that sought to extract financial resources from the
owner, the state, in return for fostering social objectives, such as high
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levels of employment or exports or the production of desired products,
all of which tended to interfere with profit maximization. Since private
owners, unlike the state, do not have "deep pockets," privatized firms
will face the threat of bankruptcy. Moreover, private owners can be
expected to exercise greater control over managerial objectives and
performance. The difficulty with this theory of corporate governance,
as the extensive literature on the separation of ownership and manage
ment in the modern corporation teaches us, is that many owners, each
with a relatively small stake in a corporation, have little incentive to
monitor the behavior of managers and little possibility for mobilizing
their fellow stockholders to take action to replace ineffective manag
ers. Thus, what is required is some concentration of shares in the hands
of one or more large shareholders to whom the benefits of monitoring
managerial behavior exceed the costs and who can influence the selec
tion of managers. Such a concentration of shares, however beneficial it
may be from the standpoint of efficiency, of course is inconsistent with
the broad and relatively egalitarian distribution of assets required by
equity considerations. Moreover, large owners are also likely to
attempt to utilize political pressure to protect their assets against the
difficulties many firms will face during the transition process.
Finally, there are problems of timing. Privatization can come about
partly from the bottom up, as small private businesses emerge and
expand, but their ability to do so will surely depend on the existence of
a "level playing field" between them and the large state-owned firms.
Moreover, it will be a long time before such small businesses can grow
to a size where they can take over large state-owned firms. Thus, it is
the de-etatization of the existing industrial stock that will largely deter
mine the pace of privatization. Therefore, putting the state-owned
firms into private hands has to be done quickly, forcing a certain mea
sure of arbitrariness and pragmatism into competition with the objec
tives of equity and efficiency.
Given these competing objectives, it is not surprising that a rather
disparate set of alternative proposals for privatization has appeared.
Among the most radical privatization proposals to come forward is the
so-called voucher scheme, in which every citizen would be given
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vouchers with some nominal value attached to them to be used to bid
for shares of the firms being privatized. The scheme could be modified
so that risk-averse voucher holders could obtain either fixed-interest
securities or shares of mutual funds that would use the vouchers of the
participants to purchase shares of the firms. Moreover, foreign inves
tors could be accommodated, either by allowing them to buy stock at
some premium over the price paid by residents, or by allowing them to
bid for vouchers offered either by the state or by the citizens of the
country.
The voucher scheme is attractive primarily because it provides for a
quick and extensive privatization of state property while simulta
neously establishing at least the relative values of firms, an excellent
starting point for the creation of a viable stock market. The proposal is
also appealing in terms of ex ante equity, since everyone starts off with
the same number of vouchers. Ex post equity is less of a problem since
it depends largely on the choices made by each individual regarding
the allocation of his or her vouchers. Nevertheless, given the lack of
any useful information about the economic performance or prospects
of the firms being privatized, it can be argued that citizens are being
forced to determine their future wealth on the basis of little more than
an arbitrary game of chance. Finally, the voucher scheme is appealing
because it creates a broadly based "people's capitalism," so that, with
everyone a shareholder, there should be strong political and social sup
port for an economic system based on markets and private property.
The shortcomings of the voucher scheme are equally clear. First, the
broad shareholding that it implies means that shareholder monitoring
of managerial performance will be weak, and managers will tend to be
unresponsive to the objectives of the owners. Second, the distribution
of wealth to the population is seen by critics of the voucher scheme as
being inflationary since, with greater wealth, people will wish to con
sume more.
A possible solution to the efficiency defects of the voucher scheme
is to give the stock of the firms being privatized to holding companies,
which would then be able to exercise effective oversight of managers.
The public would receive shares in the holding companies. The use of
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holding companies also has serious shortcomings. It is possible that
holding companies would collude with management of the firms they
own, preferring to keep poorly performing firms afloat rather than
making the difficult decision to close them down. Moreover, the power
wielded by holding companies would be enormous and, in the end, the
holding companies might well reproduce many of the shortcomings of
the old Communist system, with state control practiced through the
holding companies.
The alternative to the voucher scheme is a program of selling stateowned enterprises to the public. A state agency, possibly aided by for
eign consultants and bankers, would establish a fair market value for
state-owned firms and then sell its shares to the public, including possi
bly to foreigners. The principal advantages are that the scheme is noninflationary and, indeed, raises revenue for the government, and that
large stockholders are likely to emerge, promoting enterprise effi
ciency.
This approach has shortcomings in equity and practicality. If the
shares are to be sold, then the wealthier members of society will
emerge with the majority of the shares. Not only is this rather unegalitarian, it also favors those who had high incomes under the former
Communist regime. Since these individuals were often part of the old
political and economic power structure, the sale of state-owned firms is
often referred to as the "embourgeoisment" of the "nomenclature"
(those appointed to high positions by the Communist party). Thus, the
system not only fails to provide much equity, but appears to reward
those who, to most people in Eastern Europe, least deserve it. A further
problem is the role of foreigners who, because of the undervalued cur
rencies of the Eastern European countries, and because of their access
to international credit markets, can easily outspend the residents of
these countries in bidding for firms being sold.
The scheme is also short on practicality. Firms put up for sale will
be difficult to value, and the process of selling them will necessarily be
time-consuming, meaning that privatization will be slow. In Hungary,
the valuation of firms, especially those sold to foreigners, has become
the object of bitter controversy, further slowing the process. The popu-
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lation of the Eastern European countries lack the liquid assets to buy
shares in firms being privatized and, given the uncertain economic
future of these countries, they seem disinclined to trade cash for risky
shares.
The Conceptual Issues
of Macroeconomic Management
The change from plan to market also means that both the sources of
government revenue and the size and nature of government expendi
tures must change. Under the old system, the principal sources of reve
nue were the turnover tax, a highly variegated set of levies on sales of
consumer goods, and a set of levies on the assets and profits of enter
prises. To move to a system of uniform sales or value-added taxes and
of taxes on enterprise profits will, in a market environment, involve a
good deal of uncertainty, not the least because neither consumption nor
profits is likely to be predictable in a period of chaotic transformation.
At the same time, a new system of income taxes must be introduced to
equitably spread the tax burden to individuals who engage in private
enterprise or who own large amounts of stock. What rates to set for
these taxes, and what government revenues will be are difficult ques
tions to answer given the lack of experience with a market economy.
There will be equal uncertainty on the expenditure side. While the
state budget should no longer have to subsidize inefficient industries
and the consumption of food and other consumer goods, new and more
volatile claims on the government will appear. The creation and financ
ing of a social safety net is critical, both to provide for those suffering
from the new phenomenon of unemployment and to keep the incomes
of pensioners and the poor from being overtaken by inflation.
In addition to uncertainties about the government's revenues and
expenditures, policymakers will face uncertainty about the efficacy and
impact of traditional tools of macroeconomic policy. Although changes
in the money supply, interest rates, government expenditure and taxes,
and the exchange rate will have some effect on aggregate economic
activity, the magnitude of these effects cannot be predicted ex ante. In
western economies, economists have had a long period of experience
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with these policy tools, which enables them to make some estimate of
the impact of changes of policy on economic activity, although there is
still considerable uncertainty and controversy about macroeconomic
policy. This uncertainty will be considerably greater for Eastern Euro
pean policymakers who must deal with much larger macroeconomic
shocks using tools at whose precise effects they can only guess.
As these complex problems of transition and integration into the
world economy are being worked out in the reforming countries, they
have an impact on short-term economic developments and, simulta
neously, the success of the transition measures is strongly affected by
short-term economic developments. Thus, it is to the analysis of these
short-term trends and their interaction with the transition measures that
we now turn.

Macroeconomic Developments in Eastern Europe

In each of the three Eastern European countries undergoing the tran
sition to capitalism, the transition measures have been to some extent
limited by, but also have themselves strongly influenced, the macroeconomic environment.
Czechoslovakia

Of the three Eastern European countries undergoing transition,
Czechoslovakia was the least prepared intellectually to undertake such
a step. Few people within or outside the country anticipated the rapid
collapse of the government that occurred in the winter of 1989. The
economy, while lacking dynamism, at least was not in the state of crisis
that characterized neighboring Poland, and the Communist party
showed few signs of concern. Moreover, Czechoslovak economists
had been unable to openly discuss measures for even modest reform,
much less for the transition from communism to capitalism. The
regime installed in the wake of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of the
country had purged many of the leading reform economists, consign-
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ing some of them to manual labor, and those who remained in the pro
fession clearly understood that economic reform was a politically
sensitive subject best avoided by economists.
It is thus understandable that 1990 was a year of slow groping
toward an acceptable reform package. Early in the year, two competing
packages were put forward, one popularly associated with Valtr
Komarek, the popular head of the Forecasting Institute of the Academy
of Sciences and Deputy Prime Minister in the government that took
power in the wake of the "Velvet Revolution," the other with Vaclav
Klaus, the articulate if acerbic Finance Minister and self-proclaimed
disciple of Milton Friedman. The conservatives who sided with
Komarek preferred a slow transition process where a period of some
eight to ten years would be required to implement structural changes
that would eventually permit the freeing of prices. In these proposals,
there also was some searching for a "third way," some means of com
bining the social equity and egalitarianism of socialism with the effi
ciency of the market, in part reflecting the slogan of the reformers of
1968 who had sought to create "socialism with a human face." Privati
zation was also to proceed relatively slowly, with state-owned enter
prises gradually being sold off to domestic or foreign buyers.
The more radical proposals called for a more rapid elimination of
price subsidies and the freeing of prices within four to five years, a
much more rapid privatization accelerated by the use of a voucher
scheme and a sharp devaluation of the Czechoslovak koruna in order to
set the stage for its convertibility.
During the first half of 1990, progress on resolving the conflict
between the conservatives and the radical reformers moved slowly, in
large part because the political situation was dominated by the Civic
Forum, an umbrella organization for all the groups who had opposed
the Communists. In such a heterodox amalgam of views, compromise
rather than choice was preferable, and thus hard decisions were often
difficult to reach. Moreover, until the June 1990 elections, the rump
Parliament was loathe to take any important policy measures. Since the
parliamentary elections and the split of the Civic Forum, with a group
headed by President Havel favoring more gradual and measured
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reform and the remainder siding with Vaclav Klaus, the reform has
begun to move forward along the agenda set out by the radicals.
In the summer of 1990, food and energy subsidies were eliminated,
leading to a sharp jump of more than 25 percent in prices for these
items. This tended to squeeze the profits of firms dependent on energy
inputs, since their output prices remained frozen. A further price liber
alization was introduced in January 1991, leading to another surge of
inflation, with food prices increasing by 30 percent in three weeks.
Because the government is pursuing a strongly anti-inflationary policy,
it is hoped that these are one-time price jumps rather than the precur
sors of an inflationary spiral.
Privatization has also begun. Parliament passed a restitution law,
which cleared the way for the so-called small privatization to begin.
Under this program, retail and service establishments were auctioned
off to the public. The auctions attracted a good deal of public interest
and appear to have had the hoped-for result of improving the assort
ment and quality of service in these establishments. Large privatiza
tion, meaning privatization of large state-owned enterprises, will be
carried out with the aid of a voucher scheme to promote a rapid and
broad diffusion of ownership.
Finally, in 1991, the Czechoslovak koruna was made internally con
vertible at a rate of 28 konma/$. The convertibility is somewhat limited
in that Czechoslovak firms are required to turn their foreign exchange
earnings in to the state bank, but it is a step toward the liberalization of
the foreign trade regime.
The macroeconomic policy of the reforms has been as conservative
as their transition program has been radical. This policy stance was
dictated in part by the economic situation that the new regime inherited
from the Communists: a relatively small overhang of money in the
hands of the public, little external debt, and stable prices. These posi
tive inheritances the reformers could not afford to squander, since pub
lic opinion was clearly resistant to the outbreak of inflation at a level
such as in neighboring Poland, or to a level of foreign debt that existed
in both Poland and Hungary. Thus, the government ran in 1990, and is
hoping to run in 1991, a budget surplus. The money supply has also
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remained stagnant, resulting in the lackluster macroeconomic perfor
mance shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Macroeconomic Indicators for Czechoslovakia, 1989-1991
Percent of Growth
1989

1990

1991

0.7
1.4
0.4
2.5

-3.3
17.0
-2.7
3.8

n.a.
53.1
n.a.
n.a.

Net Material Product
Consumer Price Index
Employment
Nominal Wages

SOURCE: Josef C. Brada, "The Economic Transition of Czechoslovakia From Plan to Market."
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1991).

With the government's economic policy locked into an anti-infla
tionary posture, the level of output and employment in Czechoslovakia
has been determined largely by the effects of the transition and by
exogenous events. One outcome of the price reforms has been to create
large fluctuations in consumer demand. In 1990, consumer demand
was strong, as people sought to stock up on goods in anticipation of the
price increases scheduled for January 1991. Then in January, consumer
demand collapsed, because of both higher prices and consumer satia
tion. With the government unable to intervene to stimulate demand,
output, which had held relatively steady in 1990 thanks to the pur
chases of consumers, plunged and industrial production fell sharply, as
Table 3 clearly shows. Moreover, inflation has increased and unem
ployment has started to become a serious problem, with the level of
unemployment increasing from month to month as may be seen from
Table 4.
Table 3
Monthly Industrial Production in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1991
(1989=100)
J

~1989
1990

95
93

FMAMJ

92
89

105
100

100
100

100
99

106
98

JASON

88
85

98
93

101
94

117108
115 106

D~

96
89

1991
89
84
80
79______________________________
SOURCE: Author's estimates from Tydenik Hospoddrskfch Novin, May 23,1991.
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In addition to the collapse of consumer demand, the collapse of
exports to the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries
could not be offset completely by strong consumer demand in 1990
and not at all in 1991. The decline in Soviet demand for Czechoslovak
exports was particularly serious in Slovakia, whose industries were
heavily oriented toward the production of goods, including armaments,
for the Soviet Union. The collapse of this trade has had a particularly
severe impact on unemployment in Slovakia, exacerbating tense rela
tions between Czechs and Slovaks.
Table 4
Monthly Increases in Unemployment in Czechoslovakia, 1990-1991
(In thousands)
JFMAMJJASOND
~~1990
~- TA 8.8 12.6 19.4 27.4 43.9 57.3 67.2 77.0
1991 119.0 152.3 184.6 223.2
-------SOURCE: T'ydenik Hospoddrskych Novin, May 23,1991.

It is, of course, too early to tell whether the economy can recover
from the decline in output and the rapid increase in prices. Public opin
ion polls and government statements both suggest that the country is
bracing for difficult times ahead. With macroeconomic policy locked
into a deflationary stance, there are few ways in which output growth
can be generated through increased demand.
Hungary
Unlike Czechoslovakia, which had much to do to catch up with
thinking about transformation and reform, Hungary was the leader of
Eastern Europe both in the theory and application of the market to a
socialist economy. However, hampered by both the caution of domes
tic politicians and the limits to reform implicitly imposed by the Soviet
Union, Hungary's road to the market, begun in 1968 with the introduc
tion of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), has been a slow and
tortuous one.
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On the positive side, relative prices were less distorted than in other
Eastern European countries, the role of small-scale private enterprise
in services and in industry was quite large, and the Hungarian econom
ics profession was made up of a large number of well-trained individu
als who were familiar with western economic theory and who had
regular contacts with western economists.
On the other side of the ledger, the greater sophistication of Hungar
ian bankers and economists did not help them to avoid incurring a for
eign debt of over $20 billion, larger on a per capita basis than that of
Poland. As a result, for the past 10 years, Hungary has had to follow a
deflationary policy of limiting investment and output growth so as to
restrain the demand for hard-currency imports. This led to a long-term
stagnation of living standards and the servicing of Hungary's foreign
debt has thus assumed such overwhelming importance that it virtually
dictates macroeconomic policy.
Hungary has been following a policy of gradual and slow price
adjustments and liberalizations since the introduction of the NEM in
1968. Since price liberalizations generally mean price increases, the
government has sought to offset the effects of inflation on poor people
and pensioners by simultaneously raising minimum wages and pen
sions, although this policy is constrained by the need to keep aggregate
demand in check. Moreover, despite the long record of price liberaliza
tion, the reformers have faced seriously distorted energy and raw mate
rials prices as well as distortions in rents, some food prices, and a
patchwork of firm-specific taxes and subsidies that hamper rational
economic calculation. The Antal government has not had great success
in attacking these distortions, its most humiliating setback occurring
when a protest by Budapest taxi drivers forced the cancellation of a 60
percent increase in gasoline prices.
Small privatization is well-advanced in Hungary, with private res
taurants and retail outlets having been permitted for many years. More
recently, private small-scale provision of services and even the manu
facture of goods was permitted. Big privatization, the de-etatization of
Hungary's large state-owned enterprises, is proceeding more slowly,
reflecting the philosophy of the ruling Democratic Forum party. Priva-
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tization of large state-owned enterprises was allowed by the Transfor
mation and Corporation Laws, which set out the terms under which a
state-owned enterprise could be converted to a corporation whose
stock would then be sold to domestic or foreign investors. This proved
to be a most controversial measure leading to public outcry and scan
dal. In some cases, managers and workers were alleged to have sold
enterprises to themselves at artificially low prices; in other cases, man
agers allegedly sold their firms to foreigners at low prices in order to
ensure their, and their workers', job security. A State Property Agency
was organized in early 1990 to regulate privatization and to eliminate
abuses of the Transformation Act. However, its head resigned shortly
after taking office as the result of controversy over the privatization of
Ibusz, the state travel agency, whose shares were quoted on the Vienna
stock exchange at a premium of 200 percent over their original offer
price. The Property Agency plans an orderly sale of enterprises, but the
pace envisioned is so slow that, for the next 10 years or so, the bulk of
large enterprises will remain in state hands. Since the more viable firms
will be sold first, the state will increasingly come to hold Hungary's
industrial cripples, and whether the government budget can stand the
fiscal drain and the political system the pressure that workers in these
industries will exert remains to be seen.
The macroeconomic performance of the Hungarian economy
reflects the dilemmas and vacillation of the government. The level of
output continues to decline, especially in industry, and so does indus
trial employment, as the figures in Table 5 indicate. To some extent in
Hungary, as in the other two countries, these figures must be inter
preted with some care. The existing statistical systems were conceived
for a Communist economy where virtually all industrial activity took
place in a relatively small number of large enterprises, and the report
ing and compiling of production data for new, small private and coop
erative businesses are in their infancy. Some estimate of the magnitude
of this reporting gap in the case of Hungary can be gleaned from Note
a in Table 5, which indicates how industrial production would have
looked in 1990 had small businesses been more fully included in the
measure of industrial output.
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Table 5
Macroeconomic Indicators for Hungary, 1988-1991
(Previous year or corresponding period of previous year = 100)
Industrial production
Industrial employment
Consumer Price Index
Average gross wage in
industry (ft)

1988
100.0
97.4
115.5

1989

99.0
98.3
117.0

1990

1991

91 .5a 86.7 (J-A)
90.9 88.4 (J-A)
128.9 107.5b 104.9" 103.7" 102.4b

13.397.0

15.230.0 (J-A)

SOURCE: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Statistikai Havi Kdzlfyek, Budapest, 1991.
a. Previous quarter = 100.
b. Previous month = 100.

While industrial output is falling, inflation continues apace, creating
a dilemma for the government In 1990, the Antal government intro
duced a strict monetarist policy, which reduced bank lending to enter
prises and slowed money growth. Nevertheless, inflation in 1990 was
nearly 30 percent and the further elimination of subsidies planned for
1991 led most Hungarian economists to predict a rate of inflation
between 30 and 40 percent for that year. The government, however,
abandoned its tight monetary policy in early 1991 in an effort to stimu
late production, particularly in the export sector and among the more
profitable firms. Despite this reversal of tight money policies, inflation
in 1991 appears to be abating. At the same time, neither unemployment
nor industrial production are showing signs of recovery. Thus, the gov
ernment, because of an inability to gauge the impact of policy mea
sures and the lag with which they affect the economy, is forced to
choose between two options. One is to assume that tight monetary pol
icy is ineffective and to opt for easy money with the potential danger of
inflation and the potential gain of higher employment and output.
Alternatively, current developments can be interpreted as showing that
monetary policy can, with a certain lag, fight inflation and that some
monetary restraint ought therefore to be retained while waiting for the
positive effects of the relaxation of the ultra-tight money policy of
1990 on production in the second half of 1991.
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How much of the fall in industrial production in Hungary is due to
domestic policies and how much to external events is difficult to judge,
although it would seem reasonable to assign much of the blame to the
collapse of trade with the USSR and with the other socialist countries.
This decline in trade has been particularly large and difficult to adjust
to for Hungarian heavy industry. The curtailment of credit by Hungar
ian banks, on the other hand, as in Czechoslovakia, has been a source
of worry for managers. To a large extent, however, the worst effects of
this policy on production have been mitigated by the expedience of
firms delaying payments to their suppliers. While the long-term effects
of such an expansion of interfirm credit can be catastrophic, such cred
its do not appear to be the source of the current problems of Hungarian
industry.
There are also some bright signs in the Hungarian economy. The
private sector has been relatively dynamic, with a rapid growth of out
put and employment that has as yet eluded official statistics. Moreover,
unless Hungarian agriculture suffers either from excessive organiza
tional change or a lack of industrial inputs, it too is capable of making
a positive contribution to the growth of output and exports. Finally,
Hungary has been especially successful in attracting major foreign
investors: General Electric has purchased Tungsram, Hungary's light
bulb manufacturer; General Motors has invested in the huge Raba fac
tory; and other western investors are participating in Hungarian bank
ing, electronics, and telecommunications. Nevertheless, the slide in
domestic output must be arrested and, since the economy is likely to
suffer shocks to aggregate demand as trade with the USSR continues to
decline, the only means of reflating the economy appears to be a rapid
reorientation of trade toward the West or a domestic reflation spear
headed by foreign investment and consumer demand.
Poland

Poland is unique among the Eastern European countries in two
ways. First, it entered upon its reform with a government that was per
ceived to be in a strong position to bring about a radical reform
because it had a mandate from the population to bring about order out
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of economic chaos. This mandate was based on the face that, prior to
1990, the economy had been operating on a self-sustaining inflationary
spiral. Due to low consumer prices, the government had to subsidize
production, which led to a large government deficit This deficit was
covered by printing money, leading to higher wages and costs, necessi
tating higher subsidies for producers, and setting off another round of
the spiral. As Table 6 indicates, in 1989, inflation was high by any stan
dard, but sales, and therefore production, increased very little, with
most of the increase in sales coming in anticipation of the freeing of
prices in 1990.
Table 6
Macroeconomic Indicators for Poland, 1988-1991
(Previous year or corresponding period in previous year= 100)
Average employment
Average monthly wage
Consumer Price Index
Real retail trade

1989
98.0
391.8
351.1
109.0

1990
91.1
498.0
684.7
74.9

1991
90.6 (J-M)
113.4a (J-M)
112.7b 106.7b 104.5b 102.7b 102.7b
70.3b 102.1b 106.0b 120.0b

SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warzawa, 1991.
a. Previous quarter = 100.
b. Previous month = 100.

This strong mandate and a perilous economic situation enabled the
government to introduce a unique and radical freeing of prices in Janu
ary 1990 that is popularly called the "big bang." Developed by the
Deputy Prime Minister, L. Balcerowicz, the program freed prices
while introducing strict controls over nominal wages. In view of the
artificially low prices that had existed and of the huge overhang of
unspent money in the hands of the population, prices of consumer
goods almost doubled in January, but then inflation subsided to a rate
of 5-10 percent per month, thus ending the hyperinflationary spiral.
This increase in prices, coupled with wage restraint, reduced both
real incomes and private wealth held in the form of cash. As a result,
consumer demand declined by over 20 percent. Polish firms responded
to this decline in demand first by continuing production, some of
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which was used to rebuild stocks that had been exhausted by the buy
ing splurge that occurred just prior to the freeing of prices. However,
production for inventories could not continue forever and, with sales
remaining at low levels, firms began to reduce production and to lay
off workers. Table 7 shows the monthly evolution of unemployment in
Poland, which continues to increase. Like Hungary, Poland has
reached a point in the decline of output where some domestic or for
eign source of reflation must be found to build on the positive results of
the "big bang."
Table 7
Evolution of Unemployment in Poland, 1990-1991
(Percent of economically active population unemployed)
J

1990 0.3

FMAMJ
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L5
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JASOND
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455!o

55
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oT~

1991 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.3 7.7 8.5
SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warszawa, 1991.

Among these positive results is the ending of high rates of inflation;
indeed, as Table 6 indicated, the rate of inflation appears to be abating
significantly in 1991. The creation of a rational price system in Poland
is a further benefit, although it has not yet been fully utilized to guide a
restructuring of Polish industry. Finally, the Polish zloty was made
convertible at 9,500 zloty/$, and it has depreciated only slightly since
January 1990. The cost of these gains in terms of lower living stan
dards, unemployment and foregone production are, of course, quite
high, and the defeat of the Mazowiecky government at the polls by
Lech Walesa may reflect society's evaluation of these gains and losses,
although Balcerowicz, the architect of the "big bang," has retained
control over economic policy.
While the Polish government has acted to create markets in a radical
and seemingly quite effective way, there has been much less progress
on privatization. The broad outlines of the process are clear, but the
final enabling legislation is not as yet in place. The Polish procedure is
to mix equity with efficiency by combining sales of shares for cash
with a voucher scheme. When a firm is privatized, the bulk of the
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shares will be sold, some to the public and a "core owner" who will
own a large enough bloc to induce efficient monitoring of managers.
Another bloc of shares, about 20 percent of the total, will be offered to
the workers at preferential rates, and the remainder of the shares will
be divided between the government and the Polish population, who
will be given vouchers with which to obtain such shares. The strength
of the procedure is that it provides for a broad and relatively egalitarian
distribution of some of the stock of privatized firms with the concentra
tion of shareholding needed for efficiency. The disadvantages are, first,
the complexity of the scheme, which means that privatization will be a
drawn-out process, and second, the coexistence of a variety of share
holders who acquire their shares under different conditions and with
possibly quite different objectives.
Conclusions

In all three countries, the principal objective factors leading to the
decline in economic activity are the collapse of trade with the USSR
and the effects of anticipated price changes on consumption. While
there is little that governments in the region could do to avoid these
shocks, the decline in production in the region has somewhat mistak
enly been attributed to the process of economic reform. The major eco
nomic danger facing Eastern Europe is that this mistake will lead
policymakers to behave as if such declines are an inevitable aspect of
reform and to delay the reflation of their economies, thus drawing out
the hardships faced by the populations of the region and undermining
popular support for the transformation to capitalism.

Integrating Eastern Europe into the World Economy
Sources of Pressure for Greater East-West Trade

The countries of Eastern Europe are being pushed and pulled into
integrating themselves more closely into the international system of
trade and finance. This is good news since, in the long run, such inte-
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gration will stimulate investment, rationalize these countries' econo
mies, and foster technological progress. However, in the short run, the
forced pace of integration is likely to prove costly as many painful
readjustments will have to be made.
The push for increasing economic relations with the West comes
largely from the disappearance of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), which promoted trade among the socialist coun
tries, and from the collapse of the Soviet Union, above all, and of the
other economies of the region. The CMEA mechanism had maintained
a high level of trade among the Eastern European economies and
between them and the USSR. It maintained this high level of trade by
means of mechanisms that facilitated trade among nonmarket econo
mies, including a system of trade agreements that enabled CMEA
members to negotiate exchanges of goods among themselves and an
international payment system based on the transferable ruble. While
this system had its shortcomings, and was quite cumbersome when
compared to western trading arrangements such as the EC, it did facili
tate trade among these countries, even if its promotion of intermember
trade was based in part on the diversion of Eastern European trade
away from the West
The CMEA mechanism no longer exists, in part due to the abolition
of planning in the reforming Eastern European countries, which makes
the government-negotiated trade agreements irrelevant. Moreover, in
1990, the members of CMEA agreed that, from 1991 on, intra-CMEA
trade would take place at world market prices rather than at prices
negotiated bilaterally among members, and that trade transactions
would be paid for in dollars and not by means of the CMEA's transfer
able ruble. Thus, the two integrating mechanisms that bound the
region's economies together, trade agreements and the transferable
ruble system of clearing trade, were eliminated, and no new measures
to maintain the level of intraregional trade have been brought forward
to replace them.
In addition to the collapse of the CMEA, economic problems within
the CMEA member countries have acted to reduce the volume of
intraregional trade. The most important factor has been the economic
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collapse of the USSR. The Soviet Union is the largest trading partner
for each of the Eastern European countries, exporting fuels and raw
materials to them in return for machinery and consumer manufactures.
Due to declining Soviet oil production and the Soviet need to divert oil
exports to the West to repay debts and to pay for western goods, Soviet
oil deliveries to Eastern Europe fell by some 20 percent in 1990 and
will fall again, possibly by even more, in 1991. Moreover, the Soviet
Union reformed its trading system, decentralizing foreign trade deci
sions to individual firms, but these firms have no means of obtaining
the currency needed to import from Eastern Europe. Thus, many large
enterprises in Eastern Europe found themselves in a very difficult situ
ation. Their supplies of energy and raw materials from the USSR were
disappearing and Soviet customers, who had accounted for the bulk if
not all of the output of these firms, were unable to purchase any goods.
In 1990, trade with other CMEA countries and with the USSR was
further hampered by the realization that outstanding debts in transfer
able rubles would have to be repaid, after 1990, in convertible curren
cies. Thus, some countries were eager to export, but not to import, in
order to build transferable ruble claims against their neighbors, and
subsequently to convert these into claims payable in hard currencies.
Of course, with all the Eastern European countries seeking to increase
exports to each other and simultaneously to decrease imports from
each other, the result was a decline in intra-Eastern European trade.
The Soviet Union continued to be wiling to import for transferable
rubles, but its Eastern European partners did not want to accumulate
large ruble claims against the USSR, fearing that both the difficulties
faced by the USSR in paying western exporters and the political insta
bility of the country would make eventual repayment of these claims
highly uncertain. Thus, they unilaterally acted to reduce their exports
to the USSR. Finally, the unification of Germany eliminated the Ger
man Democratic Republic from intra-CMEA trade, a process that
began well before unification took place as East German firms can
celed trade contracts for imports, realizing that they needed to husband
their money for the difficult period they would face after unification.
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The net effect of these forces is amply revealed by Table 8, which
shows Polish trade cleared in transferable rubles and in dollars. The
decline in ruble trade reflects both the physical decline in the volume
of intraregional trade and its conversion from ruble to dollar clearing.
Similarly, the expansion of dollar trade reflects both the increased vol
ume of trade with the West and the greater use of hard currencies in
intraregional trade. Despite the redirection of trade toward the West,
the total trade of each of the countries of Eastern Europe has declined
sharply in the past two years, with obvious effects on production and
employment in the traditional export countries.
TableS
Polish Trade by Currency of Settlement, 1989-1991
(Previous year or corresponding period of previous year = 100)
Imports settled in:
Exports settled in:
Convertible
Transferable
Convertible
Transferable
currencies
rubles
currencies
rubles
106.3
93.4
102.7
102.3
1989
106.3
65.7
140.9
90.1
1990
30.1
168.7
194.2
29.1
1991-J
-F
40.8
27.9
163.3
130.2
-M
227.7
26.0
11.7
108.2
-A
301.0
15.5
122.3
23.0
-M
200.3
6.2
135.5
19.6
-J
11.6
139.2
11.2
125.7
SOURCE: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, Biuletin Statystyczny, Warszawa, 1991.

While the collapse of intraregional trade has sent Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland searching for new markets in the West, such a
westward turn has other, more positive motivation as well. The Eastern
Europeans realize that much of their industrial technology and equip
ment is obsolete. Thus, they view trade with the West as indispensable
to raising the productivity and competitiveness of their economies and
ultimately to improving their living standards. Moreover, the Eastern
Europeans believe that they must act quickly to become an integral ele
ment of the western economic system or they may lose their chance, if
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not forever, then for a long time. The closer integration of the Euro
pean Community, scheduled for 1992, has had a powerful impact on
Eastern Europe because Eastern Europeans want to become part of the
EC. They see themselves as sharing a common cultural heritage with
the peoples of the EC, and they are caught up with the "Euro-opti
mism" that the 1992 program has engendered. At the same time, they
believe that, as the forces let loose by EC-92 begin to integrate Western
Europe more closely, it will become increasingly difficult for other
countries to join. Thus, they believe that there is a narrow window of
opportunity in which they must forge the economic links to the EC that
will be the precursors to admission to full membership.
The Magnitude of the Restructuring
of Eastern Europe's Trade

To understand what the difficulties of redirecting Eastern Europe's
trade toward the West will be, we first must obtain a rough estimate of
the volume and composition of the trade that is likely to be directed
toward western markets. The CMEA accounted for about 8 percent of
world trade. However, some 55 percent of the trade of the CMEA
countries, or some 4 percent of world trade, was with each other. Due
to the effects of CMEA integration, intraregional trade was some two
to three times as high as it would have been had these countries not
belonged to CMEA. Thus, the demise of the CMEA should reduce
intraregional trade by about one-half, a volume of trade equal to
slightly more than 2 percent of world trade. While the CMEA pro
moted intraregional trade, the total trade of its members was not exces
sively high, and it may be assumed that economic rationality would
dictate that, rather than having their trade volume fall by 25 percent as
the result of the demise of the CMEA, Eastern European countries
would prefer to retain their present level of trade by redirecting trans
actions to the world market.
Thus, the first question is whether the redirection of goods equal to 2
percent of the world's international trade toward the world market
would be feasible. Since world trade grew by 6-8 percent per year in
the 1980s, it would seem that a further increase of 2 percent, especially
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if phased in over three to four years, would present few problems for
international markets. However, once one moves beyond the aggregate
and examines the commodity composition of the trade likely to be
redirected, the problem appears to be more serious. Eastern Europe's
exports to the USSR consisted largely of machinery and equipment. It
is these export capacities in heavy industry that will have to seek new
outlets in the West At the same time, Eastern European imports from
the USSR consisted to a large extent of fuels and raw materials, often
at artificially low prices. When one examines the existing exports of
Eastern Europe to the West, it quickly becomes evident that they con
sist largely of semi-fabricates and partially processed goods, not the
machinery and equipment whose quality and technological levels,
while suitable for the Soviet market, are unacceptable in the West. At
the same time, imports of fuels and raw materials at world market
prices will present a major inflationary shock for Eastern Europe.
The lack of competitiveness of Eastern European heavy industry on
world markets means that policymakers in these countries face two
choices. One of these is to attempt to make their heavy industry com
petitive on world markets by importing western technology, equipment
and technical and business know-how. This, however, would be a vast
undertaking, could proceed only slowly, and, most likely, could be
achieved only by granting a good deal of influence to foreign firms and
expanding foreign direct investment. Such a strategy may face political
resistance from populations unused to foreign owners and to being buf
feted by the impersonal workings of the world markets.
The other way of expanding exports to the West would be to expand
those industries whose products Eastern Europe has been able to sell
on world markets. The difficulty with this strategy is that such products
come primarily from low-wage, low-skill, and low-technology indus
tries. To expand such industries would be costly in terms of the costs of
moving labor and capital from other sectors, and it would be unpopular
because it neither accords with people's expectations regarding
progress nor provides for the type of high-wage employment that is
available in heavy industry. Moreover, it is precisely agricultural and
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low-wage industrial products that face the greatest protectionist barri
ers on western markets.
Thus, the redirection of trade is likely to entail significant short-term
costs in terms of unemployment, the shutting down of uncompetitive
industries, and the need to devalue currencies to make Eastern Euro
pean products competitive on western markets. The investment climate
in the region will be a major determinant of how much western invest
ment will be willing to undertake the rehabilitation of the region's
industrial structure.

Conclusions

This essay has stressed the interaction of short- and long-term forces
on the economic performance of Eastern Europe. While the catalog of
problems and challenges facing the region seems, and indeed is, daunt
ing, there are also positive elements at work. The populations of these
countries are reasonably well educated and cultural levels are rela
tively high. People are hopeful of a better future, suggesting that they
will respond to economic incentives. The most important issue for eco
nomic policymaking is that policymakers are able to understand the
disparate forces acting on the region and frame the correct policy
responses. Without a sound policy framework, the challenges facing
the region surely cannot be overcome.
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